THE ACCOMPLISH'D COURTIER:

Consisting of Institutions and Examples.

BY WHICH

Courtiers and Officers of State may Square their Transactions Prudently, and in good Order and Method.

Quis enim non vivit in Aula ?

By *H. W.* Gent.

LONDON,
Printed for *Thomas Dring*, and are to bee sold at his shop at the *George* in *Fleet street*, neere *Clifford's-Inne*. 1660.

UMI

HONOmo VIRO JOHANNI FITZ-JAMES,

De Leweston *in* Agro Durotriges (*vulgò*) Dorset-shire, *Armigero, ad* (*hujus ævi*) *Comitia Parliamentaria fœliciter cooptato.*

Domine, perquàm colende.

SUb Tui-ipsius *Vexillo* me dimicare (quanquam indignum) non dedignatus es olim. Nunc, sub Tuis auspiciis opusculum & Enchiridium hoc, usui publico destinatum & adaptatum, in lucem proferre haud dubitavi. Et (quia indignus est dandis,

qui non est gratus de datis) Gratitudinis et Observantiæ ergô, tibi dedicavi, ut, tuo Nomine et Patronatu, Momi acerbitudinem Zoilique livorem evadat, aut reprimat. Ex Musæo meo, prope *Bangor-howse*, *primo Januarii* 1658. *Stylo novo.*

Tibi devinctissimus, observantissimusque,

H. W.

To

To the Reader.

IT *is an approved Axiome*, Omnis praxis, ſine prævia theoria, imperfecta & incerta eſt. *All practice, without the* Theory *firſt knowne, is imperfect and uncertain. Experience hath taught many (and doubtleſs my ſelf) this truth poſſibly, in Armes, as well as Arts. Therefore I conceived, it would not be unworthy acceptance to publiſh the enſuing Treatiſe, wherein there will be found inſtruction not only for Courtiers, but others who are eminent in publiq; imploiments at this time, or ſhal be hereafter. If it find acceptance with thee, 'twill encourage me for future to compoſe ſomewhat of another nature, who in the Mean while will not bee wanting in ſtudyes and endeavours further to ſerve thee and the Publique.*

Farewell.

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The Accomplish'd
COURTIER.

CHAP. I.

The Argument.

The various end and aime of Courtiers. The way by which they may ingratiate themselves with the Prince, whatsoever disposition he be of. To this, end it is needfull, that a man be notified to the Prince. Some are known by the splendour of their Family, others by their own Industry.

IT behoveth every man, who desires rightly, and in order, to institute his actions; first, to consider the end, or aime of such his enterprises.

2. They who are drawn to Court, prefix not to themselves the like end; for some are led thither by hope of gain, others by ambition, and hope of honour.

3. Some are drawn thither by a desire of commanding others; some also (as *Seneca* saith) by a desire of destroying, hurting, and procuring

 businesse

businesse to others. Few propose and intend the advantage and safety of the Prince.

4. The way of obtaining this (whatever their ends be) is common to all Courtiers (to wit) the favour of the Prince. In the prosecution hereof, every one sets his wits on worke, and is very industrious.

5. To get the Princes favour, its needfull that you be both known to him, and also approve your Manners and Actions, and by some laudable way please him.

6. There are some, the Splendor of whose Family and Authority by reason of their office (whether more ample or mean; whether purchased by Money or discended by Inheritance) hath fortified their admittance to the Prince. These are exempted from labouring addresses; and are, as it were, in the mid-way to further promotion.

7. They to whom these things are wanting in the beginning are put to more labour. But when once they come to be known to the Prince, so that he judge them fit for his service, are often mounted above others, because they being raised from a lower place (at least from a meaner fortune) become more subject, and more addicted to the will of the Prince; whom they more submissively reverence and esteem, as the sole Author of their Dignity and Promotion.

8. The meanes and way of Nobles (so born) is very different and hath much disparity. The Dignity of their Office or Family puts a kind of necessity on them to maintain their own honour, and sometimes to preferr their own opinion before

fore the Prince's; who is also oft-times more difficult to promote them, out of a kind of Emulation or feare, lest their Authority should insult against the Author thereof, which to represse would be hazardous to himself and his dominion. On the contrary, the suppression of one raised from baseneſſe is more proclive; so that if the Prince turn his back on him, or suffer him to be at the will of great Ones (who for the most part have an evill eye on such) he soon failes. I speak of Princes discreet and prudent, and who know how to limit and circumscribe the power of those whom they love and advance, not conferring on One the whole streſſe of Command, but even holding under the very Peers; yet this course hath not been expedient to some Princes.

CHAP. II.

The Argument.

Two wayes to anticipate the Favour of the Prince.

THere are two wayes especially and most common and frequent whereby Courtiers procure to themselves Authority and Favour with the Prince.

1. One is the course of such who go about to procure to themselves and hunt after publique Charges, Offices, and Dignities; and, in the interivalls of such Dignities and Imployments more neer, content themselves with such as are lower & at greater distance from Supremacy.

2. The other, is of such as follow the Court

continually seeking to be imployed in the Prince's most secret businesses and extraordinary solicitations for others.

3. The last of these is the most compendious, and beares the impresse and footsteps of such as have been in the most flagrant and flourishing favour and acceptance with their Prince. Such was *Mecœnas* with *Augustus*, and *Salustius* with him also and *Tiberius* his Successor. Of whom *Tacitus* in his Annal 3. sayes thus: Although *Salustius* emulating *Mecœnas* by a prompt and ready entrance to honour, yet without the dignity of a Senator, out-stript many in power, who had triumphed and were of Consular dignity; being divers from the institutes of the Auncients by his trimnes and spruceneſse, and by wealth and aboundance more prone to luxury; had nevertheleſse such vigor of mind as was fit for great negotiations, and so much the sharper by how much he did ostentate and brag of sleep and sloathfulneſse.

The like to whom was *Mella*, of whom the same *Tacitus* in the twelfth of his Annals, saith: *Mella* being descendred from the same Linage with *Gallio* and *Seneca* abstained from the desire of honour through a prepesterous ambition, that being a Roman Knight he might equalize the power of a Consul, and also believed that it was a shorter way to get riches by procurations and soliciting for others, then by negotiating for the Prince.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

The Argument,

Divers wayes to be notified to the Prince,

TO be made known and be approved to the Prince the wayes are divers also, according to the diversity both of the Suitors at Court, and of the Times. There are some which render themselves known by some action (notably either usefull or glorious) or else by their (more then vulgar) vertue and honesty. To some, another mans recommendation hath opened the way to the Prince, and this way is more usuall then the rest.

2. Princes act in place so eminent above others, and they are hedged about with such a numerous troop of Noble and deserving Courtiers that a Novice or new commer can scarce presse through such a thicket of obstacles unlesse there be some which may lead him by the hand and even force his entrance through them, or else that he himself can (by some unusual action) draw the eyes of all men and consequently of the Prince towards him.

3. Memorable is the fact of a certain Architect whom some call *Dinocrates*, others *Stasicrates* who desiring to be known to *Alexander* the great, when all the great Ones refused to bring him to the King, consults and resolves with himself to offer himself to the Kings view, naked, and not annoin-

ted with oyl, his head invironed with a Crown of Popler ; a Lyons skin cast over his right shoulder, and holding in his right hand a wharle-Bat or clubb. And forthwith in this Attire he approaches the presence of *Alexander* sitting on the Tribunal : the novelty hereof drew the eyes of all, and of *Alexander* also, so that he commanded him to be brought unto him. And although the King he approved not the Project, yet he ordered he should be inrolled, and took him as one of his Family at Court.

4. We have brought this Example not to perswade any man that by such a Nugament or trifle he may insinuate into the Princes favour, but to shew that such (who are at a distance) unlesse they be assisted by some flourishing in Authority, are not fit to break through such a troop of men who compasse the Prince about, unlesse by some notable exploit or unusual accident they seem to merit ; and, as the Poet saith, To be pointed at with the finger ; and that it be said of him, (That's the man')

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

The Argument.

The manners, conditions, inclinations, and propensities of Princes, and their Familiars, are to be known by such as are Court-suitors.

1. AN unadvanced Courtier, and he who desires both to be known to, and beloved of his Prince, ought to consider both the manners and conditions of the Prince, and those his familiars in whom he most confideth; of great Ones also, and of all those, who either are able to assist him, or, on the contrary, (being snatcht from the Prince, either by the emulation, fear, envy, hatred, or endeavour, of himself or those about him) are able to prejudice him. First, it is necessary, that he have a clear insight into the inclinations and customs of the Prince, which do commonly follow the temperature of his body; for although this may be concealed by cautelous and wary Princes, yet it can hardly be, but that at last it will break forth, and shew it self; since all their actions are so exposed to the eyes of all men, that it cannot be, but some will take notice which way they tend. They are also sometimes so sharply stimulated and enraged, by the weightinesse of negotiations, that forgetting to dissemble, they betray their ingenies and naturall dispositions: Even *Tiberius*, although the most crafty Artificer of dissimulation, could not so well bear up the scene of his contracted brow,

but that time, by little and little, brought all his Arts to light.

2. But since the propensions and inclinations of all men, but chiefly of Princes, are divers, and almost infinite, yet may they be brought to two heads; one whereof containeth such, as respect their Greatnesse; the other, their Pleasures.

3. Greatnesse consisteth either in fame or wealth, or in the obsequiousnesse of their Subjects, or, lastly, in the strength, puissance, and faithfulnesse of Armies. In these, as the Prince fareth well, and need requireth, a man ought to accommodate his endeavours; which whosoever doth wittily, (provided he be neither suspected nor hated upon any other account) shall doubtlesse be mostly accepted with his Prince.

4. The same is to be conceived and judged, concerning the vitious pleasures and affections of Princes: If he be of a diffident and timorous Genius, you may conceive, that a bold Accuser & Delator, and one who careth not much for the envy of great ones, and is prompt and ready to execute his Prince's commands, shall find acceptance with him; such a one *Tacitus* describeth *Sejanus* to be, He had a body, (saith he in the fourth of his *Annalls*) able for labour, a bold mind, shie and wary of himself, to others a discoverer of crimes, closely flattering and proud, openly composed and modest, inwardly gripeing and covetous.

5. If the Prince delight in drinking, he will delight in those thereunto addicted; for which cause, *Tiberius* loved *Pomponius*, and *Lucius Piso*; whereof

whereof *Suetonius* writing of *Tiberius*, in his *chap.* 24. saith thus, Afterwards the Prince, (to the corrupting of publick manners) spent two whole nights and daies, in continuall eating and drinking, with *Pomponius, Flaccus*, and *Piso*; on the one of which, he conferred the Province of *Syria*; on the other, the Presidentship of the City of *Rome*; and in books professed them, *omnium horarum amicos*, his jolly friends and company at all hours.

6. The same *Tiberius*, (as *Suetonius* reports) preferred a most ignorant and simple fellow, that sought onely for a Questorship, and Tax-gatherer, before his Nobles, for drinking at a Banquet, himself taking off his whole glasses.

7. Society in lust endeared *Tigellinus* to *Nero*, as *Tacitus*, *Annal* 14. hath it: *Tigellinus*, saith he, became more strong in the Princes mind, being associated with him in his most intimate and close pleasures. So *Petronius* the Arbitrator, and Judge of Elegancy, (they are the same Historians words, *Annal.* 16.) being taken in among those few familiars to *Nero*, he thought nothing pleasant and delicate, in his affluence and plenty, but what *Petronius* had given his approbation of. After the same example, *Commodus* and *Heliogabalus*, preferred to all the dignities of the Empire, men most like themselves in licentiousnesse.

8. *Mutianus* was not so well beloved of *Vespasian*, for his faithfull duty and actions, as for that he was most fit (before others) to satisfie his avaritious desires.

9. Such covetousnesse endeared a certain youth to *Isaacius Angelus*, (who held the Empire

pire after the death of *Theodorus*) whom he made President of his Exchequer, (although he could hardly write) upon hopes to participate of the large Bribes, which he there might have opportunity to take, from such as had occasion to make use of him in that employment.

10. *Manuel Comnenus*, an Emperour also, seeking for a sharp Exactor, and crafty Artificer, in gathering of Tribute and Customes, and one that might largely supply his prodigality with mony, chose *John Pucius*, a fellow rude, and morose, and testy, hard to be accosted and spoken to, of intolerable asperity and sharpnesse; and, in a word, *Procuratorem vultu qui præferat ipso*, who carried a Procurer or Solicitor in his very face. And not content herewith, or as if that were not enough, put him in such high Authority, that he not onely trampled upon all others in dignity, but would abrogate and disannul the Decrees and Edicts of the Prince, and Ordinances of the Senate, upon pretext of his houshold affairs, shaving and poleing the most necessary advantages, (such as was the custody of the Gallies) the chief strength and benefit of the Empire.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

The Argument.

Whether or no, and how the affections of Princes are to be seconded and obeyed. How, and wherefore honest men, may undertake Courtship, and publick Functions.

1. NOw that they who desire to find acceptance with a Prince, ought to serve him in his affections, is a thing not onely very well known, but also experienced, by the daily use of Courtiers.

2. An honest man will admire this, and suppose, that by this rule, he is intercluded and shut out, from any entrance into Court, whereby he is bidden to follow the inclinations of the Prince, since they are oft-times devious and exorbitant, from the path of reason and honesty.

3. I confesse, for him that would live a life altogether innocent, and remote from the custom of those, who are addicted to evill Arts, and their own Genius, I esteem it better, that he abstain from Court, because sometimes men are there corrupted, though formerly most innocent and faultlesse.

4. Of such corruptions, let us see an example or two. *Festinus*, the familiar of *Maximinus*, in the time of *Valentinian* the Emperour, had govern'd *Asia* with much renown, and fame of lenity and modesty, being a sharp reprehender of the

the violences and cruell facts of *Maximinus*, and of the calumnies, by which he (for his own advantage) had circumvented many.

5. But obſerving, that by ſuch doings, his Companion was made Preſident of the Pretorian Bands, (which Dignity was ſecond to the Emperorſhip onely) he changed his courſe of life, and imitating *Maximinus*, did many things cruelly and unjuſtly.

6. *John Pucius*, (mentioned a little before) adminiſtred in the affairs and treaſure of *Manuel* the Emperour, with great integrity, whereby it came to paſſe, that the haughtineſſe and inhuman actings of the Emperour, became more tolerable to mens minds: At length, applying his mind (as *Nicetas* teſtifieth) to the getting of wealth, fell ſhort of none of the like Office, in covetouſneſſe; and became alſo a preſident to his friends to do the like, many of whom being corrupted by his example, followed his ſteps: Others, although better, and ſuch as could not be corrupted themſelves, yet ſuffered others to be tainted, for fear of imminent baniſhment, to ſuch as ſhould dare to oppoſe themſelves.

7. *Ariſtides*, juſt in name and deed, Preſident to the Athenians, of their publick Exchequer, at firſt, of his own ingenuity, and alſo to diſcharge the office of an honeſt man, was carefull to hinder thoſe, who were employed under him, from purloyning and robbing the Treaſury. At length they accuſe him of pilfering, and exclaim on him, as one of the moſt rapacious and ravenous thieves, that ever had been; and hardly could he eſcape condemnation. At length being quit, and his

his Office being prorogued and suspended, he was advised to imitate others, who were his predecessors; and to wink at the thefts and leger-demains of his Colleagues. So by and by he got the name and report of a good man, by the opinion and judgment of all.

8. Such courses are still taken in the Courts of most Princes, either from the malice of such, as are in chief authority, (and look upon honest men with disdain) or else by the imprudence and stupidity, of the Princes themselves.

9. Therefore to retain honesty in Court, is very difficult. Yet, if any one, by the exigency and necessity of his own fortune, or by the splendour and greatnesse of his birth and lineage, or dignity of Office, or by an impulsive desire to serve his Country and friends, or being called thither by the Prince, shall undergo this kind of life, he may persist therein, in my judgment, although a good man; at least, may live there a while; and as opportunity serves, and occasion offers it self, not onely be serviteable to himself, but others also.

10. I speak of the Courts of most harsh and cruell Princes; for to live in the Court of a wise Prince, and one who loves honest men, is far less difficult.

11. Honest men heretofore, undertook publick functions and employments, not altogether out of desire to advance the publick, but sometimes also, that they might anticipate and prevent the entrance of evill men into such employments. For the same causes may they also

alſo, and ought to ſeek acceſſe to Tyrants, and Princes given to volupty; that ſo, if not with open face, yet obliquely, and as much as in them lies, they may either impede and hinder pernicious counſells, by delaying things evilly conſulted, objecting ſome difficulties to them; or caſting in ſome more mild and plauſible.

12. *Burrhus* and *Seneca* (conſidering thoſe times) were accounted not onely good men, but good Courtiers, who being governours of *Nero* in his youthfull time, obſerved the ingenie and diſpoſition of the Prince to be leight and ſlippery, and proclive to luſt; leſt he ſhould break forth, to the debauching of any of the moſt illuſtrious women, granted him to love and court a free woman, whereby in time he reſtrained his fury, having taken for a cloak of ſuch doings, *Seneca Annaus Serenus*, who pretending love to her, openly beſtowed thoſe largeſſes, (the words are *Tacitus* his own, in the 13th. book of his Annalls) which the Prince ſecretly conferred on her. Thus a good man, not knowing how to hinder luxury, licentiouſneſſe, and perverſe counſells, may at leaſt divert them, and bend them to ſuch a courſe, as from whence leſſe hazard may enſue, both to the publick, and the Princes fame and renown.

CHAP.

CHAP. VI.

The Argument.

The rarity and condition of honest men in the Courts of Tyrants and dissolute Princes. The seminary of evill men, and the Art of approving themselves to the Prince.

PErhaps some will say, It seldome chanceth that a Tyrant or dissolute Prince takes to him an honest man. Nor can I deny that it is very rare, but this also I affirme, that there are few Princes houses in which some good man (at least) may not be found drawn thither if not by a call from the Prince, yet by a desire of accommodating the good, and infringing the power of evill ones, and may keep his Station there by the aide and benevolence of the better sort, or the friendship of some great or noble One: observing first and keeping that wholesome temperament of *Lepidus* whom *Tacitus* in the fourth of his *Annals* propounds as an example of a good and wise Courtier, who neither by abrupt contumacy hath irritated and provoked the Prince, nor by a deformed obsequiousnesse consented to all his lust.

2. The same *Tacitus* commendeth *Labeo* and *Capito*; of whom speaking. That age, saith he, bare two Ornaments of peace at once: but *Labeo* being more famous for his incorrupt freedome and liberty; *Capito* for his readiness to serve those in Authority, were much approved, *Annals* 3.

3. It cannot be denied, but that a Courtiers life

to

to an honest man is more beset with difficulties then to another man. But this labour wilbe made good by the greatnesse of the glory and pleasure of mind which he shall have. Moreover, if he act wisely, and accommodate himself to such things as hee sees cannot be changed, I dare be bold to say that he shalbe at length endeared even to the worst of Princes, more deere certainly then others in after times who seldome with due faithfulnesse transact the businesse of their Prince, at least not so exactly, but that every man may lawfully promise himselfe better service from a good man.

4. To this purpose was the Counsell of *Salustius* and *Mecœnas* whereby the one to *Julius Cæsar*, the other to *Augustus*, commended the love and friendship of good men because their owne regard of estimation, and religious Conscience, is more prevalent with them to deterr them from dishonest things, then fear of punishment can do others; or their owne imbecillity, or want of strength, can restraine.

5. But, as is said, the growth and sproutings up of evill men is more plentifull in Courts, who chiefly do approve themselves to the Prince by two causes; first by Adulation and doing any exploit the Prince commandeth, and so much the more servile is he by how much the hope of profit allureth: moreover there is this, wherein Princes much please themselves, that they may have some in comparison of whom they (although evill themselves) may seeme to be good. Others also suppose their life more secure amongst such as are like themselves.

6. *Dionysius* the Tyrant being required to expell from

from Court a certaine fellow, who by his obscenities had incurred the odium of all men, answered that he must retaine him in the Court, lest himselfe should seem to be the worst there.

7. They who know themselves obnoxious to some vices have this way with them, that they cloake themselves with a shew of honesty, by comparing themselves with those who are worse. And it is the old Artifice of such as Rule, to choose an unlike and unequall successor, that so their own doings may appear better & more illustrious. Nor was *Augustus* other wise minded while he called *Tiberius* to his assistance seeing his Arrogancy and Cruelty, nor *Tiberius* when he delivered the Empire to *Caligula*: of which, *Tacitus* is the Author.

8. But first it is very necessary that an honest man be sober and sparing in speech: for Princes do seldome give freedome to such, nor was it successefull to *Plato* the liberty which he usurped towards *Dionysius Syracusa*: for therefore was he delivered to a certaine Marriner, and sold into the Isle of *Creta*, from whence being redeemed by certaine Philosophers, he was admonished either to abstaine from the Courts of Princes, or to speak pleasing things unto them.

9. With like counsell *Aristotle* instructed *Callisthenes* his kinsman, whom he was fitting and preparing to accompany *Alexander* that he should speake but seldome and pleasant things to him, upon whose word his life depended.

CHAP. VII.

The Argument.

How, when, and with whom, a man may use Flattery. The condition of true, and free Adulation. The necessity of Assentation and flattering.

1. IT cannot otherwise be but Flattery must be used with such dispositioned Princes as have been spoken of, that so a man may oblige them. But this is not to be done after any manner of way; for, a too sordid and servile Adulation and flattery displeased even *Tiberius*; who was heard when he went out of the Court to speake in Greek to this effect (O men fitted for servitude). They are the words of *Tacitus* in the 3 of his *Annals*.

2. Flattery usurped and too often used becomes as hurtfull as when omitted and neglected. For it many times happens that he whom we manifestly flatter, suspects us of deceit and craftiness towards himselfe. It is the judgment of *Æschines* and *Plutarch*, that flattery ought to have something of truth, and of the species and shaddow of liberty and freedome; that so we may perswade not onely the Prince, but others, that we speake cordially, and thereby conserve our Credit and Esteeme with them.

3. *Cræsus* in the time of his reigne had throughly learned the Ingenies, and inclinations of kings, and what would please, or displease them: for when on a time *Cambyses* king of the Persians had enquired of those that stood about him, what they

they judged of him in Comparison of his father *Cyrus*, and all had consented that he was greater then *Cyrus*, because he had added *Egypt*, with the Command of the Sea to his paternall kingdome: but when *Croesus* his turne came to speake, he adjudged him inferiour farre to *Cyrus*, because as then he had begotten none like to himselfe. This answer seemed to savour somewhat of freedome, and was therefore the more satisfactory to *Cambyses* his vanity then the rest.

4. Notable was the flattery of *Valerius Messala* reported by *Tacitus* in the first of his *Annals*, *Messala Valerius*, saith he, added this that the Sacramentall Oath was yeerly to be renewed in *Tiberius* his name. And being asked of *Tiberius* whether or no he had uttered this Sentence of his own head answered that he spoke it spontaneously and that in those things which concerned the publique, he could use no other Counsell then his owne without hazzard of offence, and so there remained nought but the species or shew of flattery.

5. Like to this is that which the same *Tacitus* reports of *Ateius Capito* in the third of his *Annals*. That *Lucius Ennius* a Roman Knight being accused of Treason in that he had coyned into money a Promiscuous Effigies of the Prince, *Caesar* quashes and countermands the accusation, *Ateius Capito* openly slights the business out of a kind of freedome (for neither ought the power of judging and determining be taken away from States-men and Counsellors neither ought such an evill Action to passe unpunished) was not much troubled thereat. lest he should thereby permit an injury to be done to the Common-wealth.

6. It were easie to bring other examples of this kind; but those that have been produced, may suffice to instruct such, on whom a necessity of Adulation and Flattery is impoſed. And leſt such mens flattery should be conjoyned with publique or private diſcommodity, it's sufficient that it be sometimes satisfie the vanity of the Prince.

CHAP. VIII.

The Argument.

How, and after what sort, the Counsels of Princes are to be handled and ordered by a Courtier.

LEt a Courtier likewiſe beware that he intermeddle not with the Counsels of his Prince although called thereto, and so cannot honestly, avoid it. For such Princes do for the most part aske Counsell with the same mind that *Xerres* did, when he went about the Warre of *Greece*. He convocated the Princes of *Asia* as if he would deliberate with them about the buſineſſe of the Warre. I have call'd you (saith he) my Nobles to Counsell, leſt I should seem to act after my own liſt without your advice; But yet remember that your obedience to us in theſe things is rather required from you, than a carefull and doubtfull deliberation. *Cambyſes*, the Predeceſſor of *Xerxes*, deſiring to marry his Siſter, inquired of his Counsellors whether any Law of the *Perſians* did forbid such a Marriage. They obſerving that the King inquired, not so much about this

our

out of a desire to have the question absolved and his doubt cleered, but that he might have a plainer discovery of their minds, answered that no Law indeed allowed what the King required, but that there was a kind of law which avouched that Kings might do what them liked. So that a man may judge, whether credit or obedience be to be given to him when he asketh our advice, even from the inclination and disposition of the Prince, and the nature of the business.

2. You have already had Examples of Kings I will give you another of a man who although he bore not the name and title of a King, yet supplyed the office of one formerly in Spain. Ferdinando being dead, the *Pope* of *Rome* and the Emperour *Maximilian* exhort *Charles* De *Austria*, (then Agent in *Flanders*) to take upon him the title of King of *Spain*, although his Mother *Joan* the Daughter of *Ferdinando* was alive, and by reason of sickness unfit for government. The Nobles are convened in *Parliament*, before whom Cardinal *Ximenes* eloquently setteth forth reasons to excuse the Novelty of the business. The Nobles being more observant of an ancient Custome and of the Queen, then was meet obstinately vote against the King who soon after was to succeed. *Ximenes* leaping from his seat, and being moved, shews that the business in agitation, was not to be doubted on, nor needed their counsels or advice, and that Kings in their entrance to a Kingdom are not to expect the Consent of Subjects. That they which were convened were not called thither by necessity, but that they might have occasion by the promptitude, and rea-

dineſſe of their ſuffrages, to ingratiate themſelves with the Prince; and that they might ſeem to act out of duty, what was to be done out of favour. Not expecting therefore their approbation, he affirmed that *Charls* would proclaime himſelf King at *Madrid*, whoſe example other Citties afterwards followed.

3. Such reaſon of their Actions do Princes uſe, not only in like, but in moſt Caſes. Scarce any thing is adviſed for other end then this only, that their deſignes may receive approbation by the many ſuffrages, and votes they have for them; or elſe to take an inſpection of the mind and bent of ſuch as they adviſe with. Such was the fetch of *Tiberius*, as *Tacitus* witneſſeth.

4. A Courtier therefore muſt carefully ſearch out the mind of the Prince, leſt he accidentally perſwade to any thing that may prove offenſive.

5. The Princes will, being dubious, let him feigne ſomewhat to ſhake off the buſineſſe propounded, and (having brought arguments on both ſides) let him leave the free election and choice to the Prince; if he conceive not throughly the buſineſſe, hearing the reaſons on the contrary, if he be wiſe, let him alter his opinion.

6. Nor ſhall that ſhame and bluſhing (for truly it is a ſhamefull although familiar evill with great ones, that they bluſh to be inferior to ſuch whoſe advice they follow) diſorder the Prince, when you remit the liberty of concluding to his own prudence. And you ſhall alſo avoid the Perill which is imminent to Counſellors

when

when the things they advise the Prince to, contrary to their expectation.

7. If following his first designes the Prince shall not obtain successe, he will at least acknowledge the Courtiers prudence, who foresaw a future evill while it was yet evitable and to be eschewed.

8. If you be urged to give your opinion concerning a thing altogether unlawfull, you ought to find out some pretext of delay, or to intreat that a third man be called, for the more diligent examining thereof; whereby the thing being more maturely waighed, it may appeare whether any thing in it concerne the Princes dignity or safety.

9. By the former way *Burrhus* inhibited *Neroes* first attempt to kill his mother, himself promising to execute her if she were found guilty of the offence, and that that should make her defence no not her parents. In the interim while the objections are preparing to be published, *Neroes* rage is abated, fears are asswages, and the cogitation and thought of the fact, although not altogether abandoned and cast out of his mind, yet was deferred till another time.

But this way doth not often nor in all businesse take place, but chiefly in ambiguous and doubtfull matters; yet before one undertake such a businesse, a man ought to look into the ingeny and disposition of the Prince and whether he can bear such protractions and delayings or not; for there are some so impatient of loyterings and delayes, that whoever useth them, shall certainly incurre their displeasure.

CHAP. IX.

The Argument.

The ſuddain Motions of Princes, which are either to be pruned and taken away, or to be moderated.

HE that hath to do with ſuch kind of Princes, ought to be skilful and expeditious in executing ſubitanious and haſte-requiring Commands.

2. Sith that (as it oftentimes happens) we may be put to it, not to adviſe, but to find out a way to execute deſignes, if theſe ſeem to oppoſe both Reaſon and honeſty, wayes are to be propoſed as remote and at as much diſtance as is poſſible, & ſuch as may be wound about with the ſhew of Facility, or Equity, or Security: moreover it muſt be offered to conſideration, that ſuddain undertakings are diſcriminous, and full of difficulties.

3. Unleſſe the Prince be haſty and impatient, I doubt not but he will follow that which he ſhall judge to be moſt facile and ſafe. But if (through impatience) he will not hear ſuch counſels as tend to protraction, or ſtay; nevertheleſſe, ſuch a kind of anxiety of prudence, or affection towards the Prince may excuſe him that perſwades; who had rather things were done ſlowly with ſecurity then prematurely and ſuddenly with deſtruction to their Maſter.

4. But if in ſuch precipitate Courſe as the Prince

Prince shall choose, some difficulties shall occur, much more then will he perceive the prudence and discretion of him, that perswaded the contrary course. If he shall give ear to those, who propound slower waies; such interstice or pausing time, will administer many things, which may restrain the will and cupidity of the Prince; and himself may observe, that what he had design'd, could not have been done, or, at least, not without absurdity.

5. But oftentimes, that which the Prince propounds to himself, is brought to that passe, that even in its first rise, it may be acknowledged very difficult; but in its progresse, plainly unatchievable, and not to be accomplished. You may not at all animate the Prince, to undertake such things; rather with venerable silence admit, that he observe his own mind, lest while you diswade, and difficulties arise, he seek an easier way to fulfill his desire, which otherwise (spending his force amongst those obstacles) would of its own accord vanish, and be asswaged.

6. Sometimes it so falls out, that the Prince demands the execution of some wicked things, from a good man; in which case, I suppose, no man can be so well fortified with restraining reason, but that he may be sometimes tainted with such defilements, especially if opportunity, and the reason of the thing, take away all place for excuse, or substituting another to the office and administration. This course therefore was made us: of by *Burrhus*, when *Nero* consulted the killing of his mother, where no other effect followed his dissembled silence, and the strait where-

wherein he was, then; that a woman (though otherwise alwaies weak and impotent) should, after an injury, be more sharpened and imbittered.

7. For *Burrhus* and *Seneca* being sent for, stuck for some time both doubtfull and fearfull: *Tacitus*, in the 14 th. of his Annals, saith, They were both a long time silent, lest being provoked, and put to it, they should dissuade him. Afterwards *Seneca* (till this time more prompt and ready) looks upon *Burrhus*, as if the question should be put, whether or no the murther should be committed, and put in execution by the Souldiery. *Burrhus* answers, That the *Pretorians* were obliged to the House of the *Cæsars*, and (being mindfull of *Germanicus*) durst not act any bloody thing against his progeny. Let *Anicetus* fulfill his engagement. Thus *Burrhus* freed both himself and his Souldiers, from executing a very great villany.

8. I confesse, thou canst not merit at the hands of such a one, whom thou employest and entanglest in such commissions. But as the case stands, I think it more conducible, and of greater avail, that such as are like *Anicetus*, should rather execute such things, then thou.

9. Most safe it is, to foresee in ones mind and thought, the desires of a Prince; and before they break out, or take too deep root, to grub them up, or prune them.

10. There are very many, who have experienced the great force and strength, of kind and flattering entreaties, and (as *Paræsatio* called them) those silken words, which some use about such

ſuch buſineſſes as theſe. But ſuch as deſire to uſe this kind of remedy, need be in great authority with the Prince, and to have audience from him, as one ſpeaking (which is very rare) not more from affection, then from reaſon. To conclude, in ſome one or other, this courſe may ſucceed, but not in all things nor caſes.

11. Their way ſeems beſt to me, who by their genius, being facetious, and apt for witty conceits, and upon that account, in favour with the Prince, may repreſent to him the danger and turpitude, of ſuch counſells, as the Prince is feared to encline to, by ſome oppoſite and pithy Narrative of Comedy, and ſuch as may ſeem to aime at ſomething elſe.

12. To this, as we have ſhewed, a great dexterity and readineſſe of wit, and pleaſantneſſe of ſpeech, is very requiſite: And alſo he muſt take heed, leſt the Prince ſmell out and perceive, that himſelf is the argument of ſuch mimicall diſcourſes, or comicall repreſentations and ſhews: As *Tiberius*, of his fratricide, and killing of his brother, in a Tragedy, compoſed by *Scaurus*, which he named *Atreus*; and *Domitian* of his divorce, in that of *Helvidius*, concerning *Paris* and *Ceno*, believed themſelves to be upbraided. To this it is alſo neceſſary, that this narration be fitly and trimly interwoven with other things, leſſe ſquaring and agreeing with the Prince; and that which principally furthers the buſineſſe, is, that it ought not to be inculcated, and repeated ſeriouſly; and yet, leſt it ſhould ſlip by his ear, it may be iterated by a ca-

caſuall repetition. The pleaſant conceitedneſſe of the Narrative, makes a deeper impreſſion of thoſe things which are ſpoken, and becauſe they appear ſpoken, as not ſtudied-for, but *ex tempore*, and according to a preſent occaſion and ſubject, they will not offend the diſdainfull ears of the Prince.

13. Other waies there are of this Moderation, whereby you neither foment and bring aid to the Prince's luſts, nor in vain wreſtle with them, are fetcht from Occaſion, and the very nick and junctures of times; and from Accidents, ſuch as even the approach and ſuddain comming in of one of the Prince's Pages or Lacquies, may produce to you.

14. If the caſe wholly require, that you muſt oppugne ſome one of the Prince's affections, then ought you to aſſail and ſet upon another affection, equally valid and prevalent in him, and ſo cauſe a kind of reluctancy and wraſtling in the Prince's mind. And firſt demonſtrate, and carefully ſhew, that whatever we ſpeak, proceeds from that veneration and duty, which we owe unto him. By this means, *Mutianus* held *Domitian* to his buſineſſe, and kept him from acting that to *Cerialis*, which (prompted by what hope, I know not) he endeavoured to have effected.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

The Argument.

Princes have a four-fold Temperature, from their originall in Nature: How a man may converse with each of them. The Art of Courtiers, in associating others to them.

THat these things may more prosperously be prosecuted and effected, it greatly conduceth to know the Princes temperature, which they for the most part have in common with others, this onely excepted, That whereas in other matters they are more powerfull, so are they more impotent and weak, in moderating their affections and inclinations; and these, for the most part, are more violent in them, then in others.

2. He in whom yellow Melancholy, (which in Greek is called Choller) is prevalent, will be prompt and ready for action, proud, subject to anger, a lover of humble and obsequious duties and services, heavily offended with such as are refractory, impatient in executing, precipitate and hasty in Counsells, a contemner of other mens judgments, if they discord with his own; cruell to such as injure him, but placable to such as are hurt, if they remember not again the injuries; hating such as are mindfull of an offence; a speedy and preventing revenger of such, whom he fears or doubts.

3. He who shall be a mannall servant to such

a one, had need to have his eyes and Eares open, that he may readily understand and execute at the beck of his Command not objecting, nor protracting, least by his contradictions he move the opinion and Imagination of the Prince to Arrogancy, and seeme to him to think him selfe more wise then hee. Let him not be shie to submit to the meanest office, even to that which may seem below his owne fortune, let him bear injuries and not long remember them, and after an affront or rubb, be the more officious. Let him not shew or tell to any what admonitions and advisements he gives him, least he seem to upbraid him; hideing and covering over one office with another as one sayes, lest the taine beat-thorough. When the Prince is angry, let him not come neere him, for then all things will offend him, and even such as are most deere to him, neither by word nor deed, can then curry favour with him: Familiarity with such a *Genius* is easily turned into Contempt, (which therefore is to be avoyded) although the Prince himselfe incline towards it. Let all things therefore be composed rather to Reverence and Modesty: for such are Lyons, sometimes kind, but in the end cruell and fierce to such, who are most known to them, even to their keepers.

4. Such as are of a sanguine complexion are mostly of a merry *Genius*, lovers of pleasures and witty conceits, avoyding the sad intricacyes, and contests in business, desirous of peace and quietness, committing the administration of affairs to others, and bearing nothing more temperately then complaints, Courteous and full of humanity, pleasant and amiable abstaining from injuries especially

cially great ones, not more mindfull of things received then of things done, very desireous to please and accommodate others, and for the most part frank and bountifull.

5. They who are employed under such, may not in any wise neglect the duty of veneration, and must handle serious matters very sparingly. They who transact the weighty and difficult business of the Common-weale, ought not to approach his presence before they be called in, or be assured that he be not at his vacant disports and pleasures; otherwise they interrupt his chiefe delights, and cause him to blush by their sudden approach, and being taken at unawares feare a secret and tacite check or taunt from them. While *Philip* of *Macedon* was sporting, and in his *pasta Tiempo* one comes and tells him that *Antipater* was at the dore, whereupon he being disturbed, and not knowing how to obscure himselfe hid the dice in the bed, blushing to be seene by *Antipater*, when he was at his pastimes. Wherefore, as they who have the principall care of the Empire by the princes command, are supereminent to others in serious businesses; even so are they themselves outstript by others in their free and familiar accesse to the Prince, who avoydes and shunnes the more serious and grave, as discording with his owne *Genius* and naturall disposition.

6. They who have *Jove* for their propitious starr, and are capable both of serious matters, and of gameing and pastimes, are for the most part very acceptable to such Princes; so that they be cautious, that while they are absent from the Prince, their too much facility and courtlinesse diminish

dim'nish not their Authority with others. Without this observation (as the vulgar Proverb hath it) *Familiaritas contemptum parit* Familiarity will breed contempt, Contempt will give Audacity and boldnesse to make complaints, as if you did them a kind of wrong and injury, which the Prince going about to take away as being an Enemy to mournfull and sad things, will endeavour to remove him whom he shall find most manifestly culpable.

7. The Prince who is of Melancholy complexion and disposition is slow in Counsells, pensive museing, diffident, suspicious, witty, and for the most part malizing, disposed to silence, uttering ambiguityes, and rather serving and traceing other mens senses and opinions, then discovering his owne; a dissembler, an enemy to merry conceits and familiarity, loving solitude, difficult of accesse, a friend to few and but a cold one, easily hateing, by reason of diffidence and distrust (which never leaves him) avaricious, and absurdly timorous, equally hating offences and offenders, implacably desirous of Revenge, and whom (though reconciled) you had need to feare.

8. With these kinds of dispositions a man must deale circumspectly and warily, & first he ought to be moderate in his speech, and as it were to advise upon every word, lest he speak any thing impertinent or offensive, and speak not unless compelled. In veneration and reverence let him be more then ordinary, abstaining from contradictions, demurring in counsells unless urged to speak, lest his black Melancholly being incensed turne into Choller, and that into hatred; chiefly, where you think

think the repulse will be facile and easie. In requesting be not unreasonable, for to be sent away empty from a Prince is oftimes dangerous, and a Melancholick and sad person is alwayes excessive and superfluous, and will deny that he thought he had offended him whom he so dismissed and account him an enemy; this feare will hardly be bought out by any Artifice whatsoever. Such will remember injuries a long time, and do measure other men by their owne Genius and disposition,

9. In briefe, This constitution is the sharpest of all, difficult, and most uneven and disordred by reason of the variety of things which the imagination representeth and offereth to it. By which their life is made the more laborious who have relation to such mens service.

10. The Phlegmatick participateth of the weight and slowness of the Melancholick; but, as it is unlike in nature and inclination, so is it in malignity and diffidence. He hath his heart as it were environed with Cold, and from hence it is that he distrusts rather himselfe, then others, fearing to undertake great matters because he despaires of the successe, or is ignorant of the way and meanes how to carry them on. He is doubtfull in consults, fearefull in executing, of a stupid Genius, not sharp and harsh in hating, nor vehement and eager in loving.

11. For such, an active Minister, and one prompt, and ready in mind and hand, is very convenient for the Prince when he shall find one fit to execute and accomplish what he accounted desperate, perceiving the imbecillity of his owne

genius: and he will love and admire such a one, and imbrace him as a necessary Creature, and such favour which is bound with an opinion of necessity, is for the most part durable, which such a man observing may so act, that he may effect those things which the Prince looks upon as hard and impossible, and bring them to a prosperous issue, and this shall he do (if possibly) himself; at least, let him not have an associate more prompt then himself, and also beware he be not long absent from Court, lest the chief of businesses be omitted by the Prince. For if any be found fitter for such imployment, you shall be lesse valued, or at least, lesse needfull; and so being once or twice passed over, and not imployed in such commissions, be at last neglected and not accounted of.

12. It is the old art of Courtiers not to choose associates, but such as they themselves doe very much excell in vertue and prudence, that the darknesse of others may be a foil to their splendor, and the Prince may not easily find one whom he may oppose and set against them, or prefer before them. Adde that these lesser ones, as oft as there is need, will easily be open to and ready to serve those to whom they either did, or may owe their fortune, although by base and corrupt wayes and arts. This cannot justly be expected from an equall, or from him who strives in his own strength.

13. These are the kinds of humane Inclinations to which Princes are no lesse obnoxious then Peasants; being propense and readily bent, sometimes to to this, sometimes to that course, according

ding to the prepollency and force and prevalency of this, or the other Temper and constitution.

CHAP. XI.

The Argument.

Age, Businesse, and Customs, do alter and change the Temper, Disposition, and Actions of Princes; and that Inclination which by reason of fear lay hid (this fear ceasing) they betray many wise men and Philosophers, noted and observed for the same things.

BUt although these things are often thus, yet are they not for perpetuity and always so to be accounted. Age, Businesse, and Custome do vary and change the temper of the body, why not then the Inclinations and Actions of Princes?

2. In time of Warre, Princes will imbrace military and fighting men, whose favour (afterwards by degrees when things are pacified) will easily wear out and wax old. If the Prince incline to pleasures or any other affection, he will also incline to love such as are ministers and furtherers to him therein.

3. See what *Tacitus* testifies of *Tiberius*. The times wherein he was had divers changes of customes and manners; he was notable in his life and reputation when a private man, or in command under *Augustus*: close and crafty, in counterfeiting vertue, whilest *Germanicus* and *Drusus* were alive; mixt of good and bad, while his mo-

ther was healthfull; or incestable and incredible cruelty, but covertly lustfull whilst he loved or feared *Sejanus*. At last he broke forth into lewdnesse and dishonorable actions, after that he (having set aside shame and fear) followed his own Inclination. Acute and tart was the Judgment which *Passienus* passed upon *Caligula*: That there was never a better Servant, nor ever a worse Master.

4. 'Tis incredible to be spoken with what various manners, *Marius* and *Sylla* acted: And *Plutarch* makes a doubt whether Fortune changed their Inclinations, or only unvailed and discovered those mischievous dispositions which had long laid hid in them.

5. To speak rightly, The disposition and ingeny of such is not altered, but that which lay hid through feare (that being removed) breaks forth: as *Leontius* said of *Zeno* he was like a Serpent which being frozen with cold cannot hurt, but being thawed and refreshed by the heat of the fire draws forth his sting.

Tripho, as *Josephus* witnesseth, while a private person and only a Collector of the Popular benevolencies and Subsidies, personated a good man; but being made a King, presently slipt off his Vizard and disguise, and openly shewed, that whatever of goodness had appeared in him, 'twas only colourable and counterfeited.

7. Nor was *Agamemnon* much unlike him, if that be true which *Euripides* objects to him that he was modest, and easie to be spoken with, before he was made Captain of the *Grecians*; but presently after became an Enemy to his friends, inaccessib'e

cessible to all, and cloystered himself up in his own house. The Poet addeth a usefull precept.

Frugi viros ad alta vectos munerum
Mutare mores convenit nunquam suos.

Englished thus;

It sutes not well with honest men,
though ne're so highly rais'd:
To change their fashions which are good,
and cause them to be prais'd,

A worthy sentence, but practised by very few or none; yet *Pollio* seems somewhat to follow it (if we will credit *Seneca*) who saies thus: After he was promoted to the most ample degrees of honour, being corrupted by no occasion, would he decline from his accustomed and imbred love of abstinency, never was puft up with prosperity, nor ever through variety of negotiations, did he diminish his deserved commendations and glory.

8. For the most and chief defects of Princes take their rise and originall from Arrogancy, the most individuall and unseparable hand-man and attendant of great Ones. This ushers in contempt of other mens Counsells, with such who are perswaded, That by how much they excell others in power, by so much they exceed them in prudence: and some are so transported that they disdain and think it below them, to be under the bonds of e ither law or reason, and that

they cannot be Princes unleſſe they may do what they liſt according to that ſaying.

Sanctitas, pietas, fides,
Privata bona ſunt: quæ juvat,
Reges eant.

Sanctity Piety and faith, are good to private and common perſons. Let Kings go which way they pleaſe.

9. I ſhould leſſe wonder if vulgar Ingenies were only corrupted with ſuch opinions, but I ſee that the beſt of mortalls have their minds blinded with theſe deluſions and cheats of power and Puiſſance.

10. No man heretofore ſurpaſſed the ſeaven wiſe men of *Greece* in the precepts of moderation: and none that ever came to the Empire were more cruell Tyrants then thoſe who came from among them.

11. *Appianus* being about to ſpeak of *Ariſto* the Philoſopher rehearſeth ſome; who profeſſing that name formerly, had exerciſed Tyranny at *Athens*: he addeth moreover that ſome of the *Pythagorians* (whom he names) who had gotten imployment in *Italy* had very unjuſtly abuſed their command, which makes us doubt whether thoſe Philoſophers who ſo proudly contemned honour and dignities, did it *bonâ fide* and in good earneſt; or rather took it up as a pretext, and a cloake for their beggerlineſſe and ſloath.

12. Certes, if we may credit *Ariſtophanes*, thoſe *Pythagorians* lived frugally and ſparingly, not

not for vertue, but through poverty, not refusing to sup daintily, if any invited them.

CHAP. XII.

The Argument.

How far Traitors may prevail with a Prince by flatteries; and how a Prince is to be warned and admonished against such.

1. BUt oftentimes vain fellowes do insinuate and creep into Princes, by occult and secret suggests and flatteries, who do very much alter the Prince's genius and disposition.

2. To such kind of men, *Tacitus* imputeth the haughtinesse and crudelity of *Vitellius*.

3. *Vespasian* being naturally of a modest ingenie, learnt of such Masters to oppresse his Subjects, with the iniquity of Tribute, as the same *Tacitus* testifieth. But in brief, it is most certain, that most of them who have made use of such mens services, have degenerated. Such impostors curry favour with the Prince, while they ostentate and boast before him his greatnesse, power, and utility; who doth so much the more willingly embrace them; by how much the lesse he knowes and understands the parts of his own office and charge, not perceiving, that they applaud him, that so they may betray him, and expose him to odium and contempt.

4. And truly, the most secure way of betraying a Prince, is the being obsequious and serviceable to him in his avarice, cruelty, and lust; be-

cause that he cannot condemn the Traitor, but he makes himself guilty.

5. The *Francs*, a people in *Germany*, with the help of *Egidius*, then commanding by the Roman power, had driven *Clodio Comatus* out of his Kingdom; one of his friends desiring to have him restored, associates himself with *Egidius*; and having had sufficient knowledge before, how to do it, inflames and stirs up his avarice and cruelty. At length disdaining the Roman illegalities and injuries, the *Francs* return to love their King again, and recall him to the Scepter and Kingdome. So this *Franck*, to betray his Masters enemy, makes use of his own cupidities and lusts, very prosperously.

6. *Sejanus*, when the Roman Empire was approaching, and ready to fall to him, see how many arts he useth: He had made his observation, how that the City began to disdain *Tiberius*, after that *Agrippina* with her children, were at his motion imprisoned. And seeing him inclinable to a cessation from businesse, neglects not to perswade him thereunto; hoping, that during his absence, the stresse of the Empire, and rule of businesse, would be left to him; which so fell out. And in truth, *Tiberius* for some little time, was Lord of a little Island, and *Sejanus* Emperour.

7. *Pertinax* guiding the Empire, first circumvented and took away those, who delayed his hopes, by a pretence of conspiracy, which *Lucilla* had wrought against *Commodus*; afterwards drawes and enticeth *Commodus* to voluptuousness and pleasure, whereby he in the interim might undertake

undertake the chief affairs, and at length obtain the Empire.

8. The same way entered *Bardas*, uncle to *Michael*, Emperour of *Constantinople*; for he took away *Theoctistus*, the Prince's Tutor, and his own colleague; and caused *Theodora*, the mother of *Michael*, to be banished, perswading his young Pupill to take upon him the government; whom, though much unlike himself, he by and by turned to volupty and delights, who giving himself at length to the driving of Coaches and Waggons, knew no better Art then that. *Bardas* mean while makes ready the desires of the people for himself, calls to him the learned men, restores learning at *Constantinople*, and had plained out a notable way for his entrance to the busineſſe, had not another prevented him.

9. I bring not these things to teach any, how Princes may be circumvented, but that good men may admonish Princes themselves, that they account not such men, who sooth them up in their lusts, and depraved actions, more faithfull, then they, who are bold sometimes to denote and observe their evill deeds, with the black pencill of condemnation and disallowance.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

The Argument.

Of the Domesticks and familiars of Princes, and how to obtain their friendship.

HAving considered what a waiting Courtier is to do, in respect of the Prince, let us come now to what he is to do, in respect of, and amongst those, who are his domestick servants, whose Office is continually, to be employed about the Prince's person; and therefore very usefull for such, as seek addresses to him, either by procuring them an extraordinary accesse, or by mentioning them to him, or informing them of occasions and opportunities, to dispatch their businesse. Princes for the most part, carry one kind of countenance in private, and another in publick; and do more freely disclose their minds to those their domesticks, whom they believe to be faithfull and trusty, supposing that their humility and low condition, is not capable of any endeavour, either traiterous or mischievous.

2. Who knowes not, that *Claudius* was subject to the commands of such, who had been bondmen? One whereof (*Pallas* by name) he had so enriched, that himself on a time, complaining to one of his wants, had this reply, That if he made sure to be adopted by *Pallas*, he should forthwith be rich. The same was the Author, that *Claudius* married *Agrippina*, after that, by the help of *Narcissus* (formerly also a bondman) he

he had slain his wife. *Messalina.*

3. Who knowes not also, that while the Empire of *Constantinople* stood, the power thereof, was sometimes upheld by Eunuchs; and but for them, *Arbetio* the chief Commissioner of the Empire, had lost his life, when *Verissimus* accused him.

4. *Borilus* and *Germanus*, two kitchen-slaves, by the authority whereby they held *Botoniates*, one of the Emperours, altogether subject and obnoxious, rendred him strange and absurd to *Isaacius*, and *Alexius Comnenus.*

5. Put case, the Prince doth not communicate his counsells to them, yet are they more easily sifted out and accused by such. Nor can it be, that a Prince can alwaies keep on his vizard in private: Affections kept close and suppressed, break forth amongst the multitude, and become conspicuous to men, when privacy before hath given them liberty.

6. It is a thing altogether necessary in Court, for a Prince to esteem men of all kinds, even the vilest, usefull to him; and to believe certainly, that prudence and ingenuity encrease together with authority and fortune; which *Arrianus*, writing to *Epictetus*, shewes, by the example of *Epaphroditus*, and his two slaves, whereof, although one was Groom of the Stool to the Emperour, the other a wiper of shoes; yet afterwards *Epaphroditus*, who had lately sold them as unusefull creatures, not onely insinuated into their favours, but also commended their prudence and discretion.

7. Fortune scarce ever advanced any man to that

that height in Court, but that she procured him as many foes, as friends; and never brought any man so low, but that she could afterwards either hurt him further, or again in some kind or other do him good. Whereupon not in vain, is the observation of *Tacitus*, in the 6 th. of his Annalls, That while *Tiberius* was Emperour, it was accounted a magnifick and stately thing, but onely to be acquainted with, and known to, the Porters of *Sejanus*.

8. It will be then the part of a wise and prudent man, to procure the friendship of the Prince's Familiars, whatsoever they be, by any such officious serviceablenesse, as reason and reputation will permit.

CHAP. XIV.

The Argument.

There are four kinds of great ones at Court. How the first sort ought to be honoured, observed, and entreated. How cautiously a man ought to confide in Princes, who are not very constant.

FRom the Prince's familiars, let us come to such as are great at Court, who are of divers kinds: Some are eminent, by the splendour and excellency of their birth and parentage, yet are not in intimate favour with the Prince; others very gratious with him, and yet not mounted to honours; others prevalent with him, both by honour and favour; others both flourish in his favour, and are employed in negotiations.

2. The

2. The benevolence and good will of the first sort of these, will little conduce to thy grouth in preferment, who nevertheless are to be courted and reverenced, both for their own merits, and also because, that though they may not hurt you themselves, yet may they by their retainers and friends.

3. For men of illustrious and noble Families, are highly esteemed, and prevail much with such, and with others, by being obliged by an old kindness or good turn with others, by the reverence and esteem of their greatness and fortunes, (which easily changes the Princes mind) do therefore favour them, and Retainers to their service.

4. *Archilaus*, King of *Cappadocia*, had omitted to salute and court *Tiberius*, when he was Agent at *Rhodes*, to his great prejudice and mischief; for *Tiberius* (having got the Empire) out of a desire of revenge, pretending something more specious, commands him to be called to *Rome*, where the wretched man dyed an untimely death: Yet the Historian testifieth, that he omitted not that duty through pride, but being admonished by some intimate friends of *Augustus*, because that while *Cajus Cæsar* flourished, being employed in the Orientall affairs, friendships and correspondencies with *Tiberius* seemed unsafe.

5. We are here to consider, that great ones of this sort of fortune, as they are oft-times impotent and weak in meriting, yet have strength enough to hurt you: These therefore, although they seem burdenous, and suspected to the Prince,

Prince, are to be reverenced nevertheleſſe; and we muſt make ſome pretext to reſtrain their envy, leſt they become our enemies.

6. If it happen, that the Prince will put thee into the hands of ſuch, (which is uſuall with Rulers) as you may not refuſe this kind of conteſt or combat, ſo ought it to be managed with great Art, and choice of Occaſion and opportunity, that all men may ſee that thou acteſt not only by reaſon, but alſo giveſt ſatisfaction to the Prince. Such an enterpriſe is full of hazzard, but (if undertaken, as having the Prince for its author) is the way to augmentation and encreaſe of favour.

7. One here acts all things, in his own name, although he have many helpers, eſpecially ſuch as are under the degree of Nobility; for fear, leſt if they ſhould not do ſo, they might offend the Prince.

8. Another adheres more cloſely to the Prince, by the encreaſe of his fame and renown, if he be prudent, chooſing ſpecious occaſions, of doing laudable ſervice to his Prince, and to the emolument and advantage of the Publick.

9. But a man muſt be very cautious, leſt he attempt any thing, that thou canſt not bring to paſs; for, beſides that the vulgar judge all things by the event, and believes, that Right and Juſtice ſtands in the ſame ſtation with Fortune, you will wonderfully weaken your fame and favour, wherewith the Prince embraced you, by ſiniſter ſucceſſe: For he, to aboliſh the ignominy, and becauſe he fears, leſt he ſhould be debaſed in the eyes of his Subjects, and animate his adverſaries,

ries, whom he in vain opposed, will be constrained to disguise and hide this authority, and the esteem he had of you.

10. Yet take heed that you believ not, that while I speak of contesting with Nobles & great ones, I would have you act any thing, or deal with them by force, since that cannot be done without tumult and noise; nor that you set upon him with contumelies, and calumniations, for that's the part of men of mean fortunes, and base corrupt judgments, and their end is seldom honourable or auspicious. See how it fared with *Piso*, whom *Tiberius* had sent into *Syria*, to restrain the hopes of *Germanicus*, who carried himself so insolently, that the Prince, having advanced *Germanicus*, was necessitated to leave *Piso* to publick odium and hatred.

11. When we perswade you to counterplot the designes and endeavours of great ones, and Nobles, we understand such who are unjust, and undertake something, either against the state of the Common-wealth, Religion, Justice, the government of Armies, or publick Treasure; whom you must so meet with, and prevent, that it may appear to all good men, whom it concerns, that you are not acted therein by any private provocation, but by an honest care of the Common-wealth onely.

12. If you would have an example for your imitation, I shall name Cardinall *Ximenes*, who was chosen by *Isabella* Queen of *Castile*, to oppose the Nobility, who then were not so subject to Kingly command, as at this day. From being a *Franciscan* Monk, he was made the Queen's Confessor,

teſſor; and afterwards, by the counſell of Cardinall *Mendoza*, Arch-Biſhop of *Toledo*; and laſtly Inquiſitor of the faith; and acted with great Authority amongſt the Spaniards, and (being the chief Commiſſioner in the raigne of *Iſabella*, after that in the Raigne of *Ferdinand*, and at laſt when the Empire deſcended to *Charles* the fifth) contested ſo with the Nobles, that he held both Prince and people ever devoted and addicted to him.

13. It was reported that he died by Poyſon, and himſelfe was ſuſpected; but the thing could never be proved, and therefore his death may be more rightly imputed to aged nature (for he was very old when he deceaſed). And nothing hindereth but that he may be believed to have maintained, and kept his owne fortune (which moſtly he ought to himſelfe and his owne endeavours) intire and flouriſhing even to the laſt moment.

14. The ſame fortune attended not upon *Cicho Simoneta*, who when *Franciſcus Sforzia* and after him *Galeacius* his ſonne, poſſeſſed the City of *Millane* in Lumbardy under the widow-mother of *Galeacius* (who was young and under age) was ſet to oppoſe the brothers and heires, in regard of his truit and prudence; and being beloved for his mannagement of affaires.

15. He, that he might preſerve the Empire and Command for his pupill, thruſt out the brothers of *Galeacius*, and *Robert* de. *Santo Severino* from the citty of *Millane*. But imagine what envy he underwent, and alſo how lewdly he was ſoon after deſtituted and forſaken: for the widow-Mother returning into favour with her adverſary made *Simoneta* the price and reward of her amity and

and friendship with them; by whom being a long time detained in prison, he perished miserably tortured and quartered by them. Learne hence, how cautelously one ought to trust princes whom you did not sufficiently know to be constant. Such will prostitute their Ministers for a leighe matter, to the lust and will of their very enemies.

CHAP. XV.

The Argument.

A Second Third and Fourth kind of Nobles or Courtiers, and the reason why each of them ought to be esteemed and allured.

1. THere are some Nobles (as we said before) gracious indeed with the Prince, yet live without the dignity of office and charge. These if they contribute not to confirme and settle us, yet may procure us so much favour with the Prince, whereby it may be done.

2. They are also usefull by commemorating our merits, or, if need be, to excuse our failings; and by protecting us against the Calumnies, and private accusations, and detractions of others; who (if they be benevolent) may much advantage us; if irritated and offended, may much hurt and annoy us. Wherefore the favour of such is to be purchased by any means, at least such as are not unbefitting, or below our condition. You may imagine that these are not so daily tied up to observe the Princes domestick customes and uses; but that sometimes they look abroad to others.

And although they have not imployment or office and charge, nevertheleſſe thoſe whom they recommend, (if not otherwiſe unworthy, or ungratefull to the Prince, or unfit to undergo imployments) are ſeldome deſpiſed, ſometimes preferred before others, who (though not unequall in deſerving) are yet deſtitute of ſuch friends and aſſiſtants.

3. The third ſort we have ſpoken of, are ſuch who being adorned with great Authority in affaires, are yet but meanly favoured by the Prince. Theſe are found eſpecially with ſuch Princes who live peaceably, and mind their pleaſures being careleſſe of publique affaires, and therefore (committing the government to one or other who are faithfull), become averſe to hard and difficult buſineſſe, out of a feare of their importance and weight.

4. In ſuch a juncture of affaires, you ought to be more ſtudious in ſeeking the favour of the Miniſters of State, then of the chief Ruler; for he will permit them whom he intruſteth with the adminiſtration of government, to chooſe and delegate others to offices: for it would ſeeme weakneſſe in him to chooſe any for officers, whom himſelfe knowes not to be fit for imployment.

5. There are other Princes, who being more tenacious and ſtedfaſt to their government and Majeſty, themſelves conſtitute Officers of State, yet admit them not to their familiar Converſe and Acquaintance, nor to their preſence, unleſſe ſome weighty buſineſs be in agitation, nor intruſt them with the dipenſing, and beſtowing of Offices, out of miſtruſt and jealouſie leſt their power by the multitude of Clients and Attendants, ſhould amplifie

plifie and rise to such a height, as that from thence, (if they should offend) they cannot be taken downe and dejected. The old custome of such Princes hath been to hold such Ministers under some kind of awe, and to give them ground to believe, that the pile and Bulwarke, which they by their labour in so long time have been building, may with one winck of his eyes be demolished.

6. 'Tis very hard to perceive how you should carry your selfe towards such great Ones, whose power is so circumscribed and limitted: their good will may not much benefit you; perhaps, (if the Prince perceive it), it may prejudice you: And being without it, you will more hardly come to the managing of your busines; and you will sometimes be even inforced and necessitated, not without hazard, to concurre with them.

7. Here will need very much circumspect courtesie and mildness; you must treat them with all the offices and duties of veneration, and civill deportment: and upon occasion testifie (though warily) your secret promptitude and readinesse of mind. Meane while, neglect not to seek out another Trumpeter or spokesman who may support and underprop thee, and so thou mayest be more closely joyned with, and notified to, the Prince.

8. Such Nobles remaine to be spoken of, who are prevalent both in respect of favour, with the Prince, and also in regard of office: these (in brief) are to be honored almost equally with the Prince.

9. The inclinations and will of such, are to be inspected and looked into, and ought to be known

and executed, next after the Princes.

10. After this manner therefore, the power and authority of the great ones being (as by degrees) subducted, you will not be ignorant what may be hoped for, and expected from them, for you must carefully beware, that you aske nothing from any of them, which you or they see, cannot be effected: for there is nothing that more molesteth humane ingenuity, then not to be of ability to satisfie the request of one, whom a man loveth and affecteth.

11. Therefore benevolence, being preoccupated by uncivill supplication, or remedilesse difficulty, is offended. And know, that he from whom you have suffered a Repulse, will shun to see you, for feare, lest by the impudency of such a like request, you put him to the blush, as if through defect of Authority and power, he could not do what you desire.

12. But (this by the way may be added) accesse to the knowledge of great ones is not presently open, it must be wrought by degrees. They who can do very much with them, whether Strangers, or Domesticks, and their dependants and adherents, are to be allured, considering what abilities each of them hath, wherewith to advance and help others.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVI.

The Argument.

Who those Courtiers are, which are under the degree of Nobility, and what is to be done with them first; what is to be done with enemies which hate us for our friends sakes, because offended by them.

1. THere are others in Court, who (being set below the ranck of Nobles) are either our superiors equalls or inferiours. And these are of two sorts; some more apt and ready to benefit us, others to prejudice us. The Authority and power of both is diligently to be waighed and considered, as that, which may either promote, or impede, and hinder what we affect and sue for. Their friendships and affinities also are to be pondered, necessity of times requiring that we act with them, by their owne servants and followers rather then by our selves, using their Counters to reckon our Game by; at least, by them, deprecate and turne away envy from us.

2. But first we must take heed, that we do not then onely seek their friendship, when we just need it; we ought to have it already prepared, and knit fast by the pledges of ancient benevolence and good will.

3. There are three sorts of those who may hurt and hinder us; for they are either such as are enemies, or envious persons, or else Competitors and Emulators.

4. They who are enemies, hate us either for

our own sakes, or for some of our friends sakes who have offended them; but this last odium and hatred is for the most part lesse sharp then the other, and may be allayed, and mitigated, by some good office, whereby we may witness that we love our friends; but cannot forthwith hate all their Enemies.

5. But for the most part the friendships of Courtiers are factious, and cruell; and they will wish and advise you to abjure all familiarities which themselves envy.

6. For this cause, some openly preferring the friendship of one party, have nevertheless not failed to imbrace the other party secretly: not that so they might betray their friend, but in in case he should faile, provide a refuge for him.

7. Such prudence is not only happily and successfully used in Court-contests, but also in Empires. *Syennesis* being Vice-roy of *Tarsis* when the warre began between *Cyrus* and *Artaxerxes*, fearing to oppugne and fight against *Cyrus*, imbraced his party, but sent his Son to *Artaxerxes* to be a refuge to his father, in case *Cyrus* were conquered.

8. *Bardas Darus*, having escaped from the imprisonment of the *Saracens*, seeing that *Bardas Phocas* was created Emperour against *Basilius* sought the amity of *Phocas* being as yet his enemy but sent his Son (feigning that he fled away against his will) to follow *Basilius*, and to intercede for his father in case *Phocas* were conquered; which also came to pass.

9. *Solon* when the Common-wealth discorded, ordained

ordained that none should be permitted *Adiaphory* or neutrality; nor do I think that 'twas his mind that friends imbracing contrary parties should not send and return a message to a private friend; but rather that he hoped, that friends following and pursuing divers ends, would then labour more greedily and happily for publique peace.

10. After the same manner in Courts, although you be of a contrary faction, yet may you keep friendship with one that is of another faction, both to the end you may have a receptacle in a changed fortune, and also that you may be the fitter to reconcile minds inclining to milder things. There is no safer nor honester means and way to ingratiate your self with either contending party, amongst those discords, and contentions that arise amongst great Ones.

CHAP. XVII.

The Argument.

How we must deale with such who hate us for our own cause, and are offended with us: where also is intreated of Threats and Injuries.

THey who hate us for our selves, do it either because they are offended with us; or else, (as is very familiar with great Ones towards their Inferiors and as the Italian Proverb hath it, *Qui offendit, non condonet*, He that gives the offence, let him not forgive) because they have

offended us. Minds swelling with great fortune have this fault chiefly. Whom they hurt, they hate.

2. The best remedy for such Injuries, as these do to us, is, If they be not understood and known; but if its weightinesse shall give it a marke of an offence to us understood, let us soon demonstrate a mitigation of grief for it, and that the remembrance thereof is defaced and blotted out of our minds. Else, if they perceive us to bear it impatiently, we strike into them a fear of our revengefulnesse, and so, a desire of preventing us.

3. But chiefly let us forbear threats, especially if we be not presently prepared to execute.

4. For threatnings rouze up the vigilancy of adversaries, and do provoke them to hatred and to double the Injury, and often brings us to shame, if we breath out revenge, and have not power answerable to our will.

5. I know this moderation is not approved by all men, chiefly, by such as are revengefull, who are of opinion that no Injury is to be passed by without sensibility, not onely in regard of the sweetnesse which is in revenge, but also, because that if you bear with an old Injury, you invite a new; and therefore think fit to prosecute with immortall hatred, those who offend them. But such, while they desire to render themselves formidable, and dreadfull, produce this effect to themselves, That no body will have Commerce with them. Sithence therefore, all are mortalls are prone to lapse and digresse and so either affectedly

tedly or through incogitancy and want of heed are carried away, let every one for fear of giving offence, shun those who are so tenacious and ready to hate, even as wild and savage beasts, leaving them to their own solitude. Lastly, if he shall also offend, he will yet expect all amicableness from the other party, and while he feares revenge, will desire to inforce and strike the first blow. Wherefore to avoid so many evills, I think it best to insist rather and pursue the contrary way, and do prefer lenity and mildnesse, which is not difficult, no not in the greatest Injuries; respect being first had to the difference, both of the cause by which; and to the condition and quality of the persons, by whom the Injuries is committed.

6. For in lighter injuries, and such as have their rise rather from Perturbation and trouble of mind, then Malice, we ought to be so unoffended as that we seem not to be at all sensible. If the injury be heinous, let us shew our selves carefull and tender of our reputation and esteem; yet not be so implacable to the offending party, as not to leave him hope of reconciliation, and place for pardon in case of satisfaction. To which end, I judge it not unfit to complaine of the wrong to the friends of him who hath injuried us, and to commit the cause to their Arbitration.

7. I am of opinion that those wrongs which are insultingly done, through malepertness and petulancy, and out of a humour to reproach, are forthwith to be vindicated, yet not so much with a desire of revenge, as to chastise the offender, that

that so he may learn to demeane, and carry himself more modestly, not towards us only, but towards others also.

8. Yet such are not to be revenged on with implacable hatred; rather ought we to testifie our grief for the necessity of vindication which is laid upon us. And (after Amends and Restauration made) that we are ready according as the nature of the trespass will admit to redintegrate and renew our friendship and amity with them.

CHAP. XVIII.

The Argument.

How the Injuries of great and small are to be avoided; and how to be handled. Severall Artifices and devices for reconciliation and reingratiating.

But because, such abuses are commonly put upon us by such as overpower us; The first remedy to avoid these, is, not to deal with them but with much reverence, and respect, taking heed lest they disdain your familiarity with them, or (if they be more rough and austere) altogether decline to converse with them. Notable is that that of Martial.

Si vitare velis acerba quadam,
Et tristis animi cavere morsus;
Nullis te facias nimis sodalem,
Gaudebis minus, & minus dolebis.

Englished

Englished thus.

If shun thou wilt most bitter things,
From sad remorse secure thy mind.
To none become too much a friend;
Lesse joy, lesse grief thou then shalt find.

2. The second is not to prefer the sensibility of an injury before ones own safety: for, it is neither safe, nor is it a wise mans part, to strive too much with one more powerfull then himself. Let the disparity of abilities be a just pretext to excuse thy disguised Dissimulation.

3. I know that some perswade themselves that an adversary smitten with fear, will come and crouch and begge pardon and reconciliation; nor can it be denied but that some low and poore spirited ones, will sometimes so farre debase themselves, and stoop so low: but such a reconcilement and peace-making is but feigned, and will never prove sincere. Nor do such omit, (when occasion is given to renew injury) to indulge and dispense with their own minds; and by how much the more timorous and fearfull they find a man, by so much the more cruelly and outragiously will they aspire and breath forth vengeance. Therefore since an occult and close-lying enemy, is more difficult to be avoided, then an open and declared one, it is better (after some sort) to have such open enemies, then friends reconciled when enforced thereto by fear. I speak of those, who being not greater then our selves,

of

of Amity be broke, they can doe us little harme.

4. For if we have to do with one greater then our selves whose Emnity may eclipse our Lustre, It were better to hold his affection redintegrated, and renewed, though fictitious and feignedly so, then to have him appear an open Enemy.

5. If we have been the first offenders, let us be first in appeasing the party offended, either to themselves, or by mediation of friends.

6. Now that we may discern who are of most ample ability to suppresse and hinder us, it is needfull, not only to consider their power, but their affection, by which (besides their hatred) they are carried to do us hurt.

7. For some are acted by a desire of hatred, (the Piedee and Laquey of revenge) others by fear, lest having gotten and obtained what we prosecuted, we should thereby bee better armed to prejudice and offend them.

8. That first and worst affection is violent, but that of fear is more violent, for Court oppressions; but that enemy, who, besides this, is stimulated also by that other, is the most inevitable.

9. The former may be mitigated, by humble and satisfactory services; but the timorous will scarce ever be perswaded, to change his fear into a confidence, and assurance of your benevolence towards him; yet this must be assayed by all means, which occasion and opportunity will rather give him to understand, then any instruction or discipline.

10. *Agesilaus,*

10. *Agesilaus*, that he might make them his friends again, whom he had offended, would promote them to the most honourable places and offices; in the administration whereof, when they had incurred envy, (as is commonly seen) the accused are constrained to fly to the Prince, who delivering them from hazard and infamy, obliges them by this good turn, to become his sincere friends.

11. It is a very familiar artifice, and subtle trick used in Courts, to supplant and remove a man secretly, that so thou being advanced by this kindness and good office of his, maist be the more strictly engaged and obliged to him.

12. Not less frequent in Court is that dangerous, and to be avoided craft and wilineſse, of *Eutrapelus Horatianus*, who was wont to lend mony to men, to supply their luxury, and would puff up the minds of those, whom he intended to accommodate, with a good round sum.

13. In like manner, they who applaud and allow us in our pleasures, affections, and expences, and advise us to undertake such things, as exceed our strength and abilities, (which also they extoll beyond desert) or such things as are against reason, do most-what go about to hurry us to ruine and destruction.

14. But let us return to the means of renewing friendship with Enemies, amongst which, this is in no wise the last, or least, *viz.* to assist the wishes and endeavours of an Enemy, both by counsell and endeavour, when you see that you cannot impede and hinder their success that so he may seem to be engaged to love by your good turnes.

15. By

15. By this means *Ascanius Sforcia* the Cardinall, observing, that he in vain interceded and went about, to hinder the machinations and plots of *Julian* the Cardinall, who laboured to advance *John*, the Nephew of *Alexander* the sixth, to the Cardinall-dignity, did afterwards so affectedly act on *Johns* side, that he obtained it for him; and after that, became a greater favourit to him, than *Julian* himself.

16. If the stubbornesse of the enemy frustrate all endeavours of reconciliation, we must at last observe, whether our adversary hath not some other, whom he envies, and fears more then our selves; if so, and he seem to prosecute the same designe, which we do, you may so deal with the adversary by a friend, that though his hate be equally prevalent towards both, yet may he either favour or lesse hurt and obstruct our party.

A device, not unlike to this, was that used by *Gerlachus*, the Bishop and Elector of *Mentz*; when he intended to create *Adolfus Nassovius* his kinsman, Emperour. He knew, that there was variance between the Princes, who were very likely to get, or else designed for, the Empire then vacant: He deals with the Electors, (whom he was about to make use of for his purpose) privately and apart: He admonisheth *Vincestaus*, then King of the Bohemians, that most of the suffrages and votes of the Electors, went against *Albertus* Duke of *Austria*, *Vincestaus* his enemy; nevertheless he himself was ready to hinder and stop it, if he perceived, that *Vincestaus* consented. Having perswaded *Vincestaus*, he sets upon the Duke of *Saxony*, and reports to him, that the

Duke

Duke of Brunſwick (his adverſary) was the next in hope to atchieve the buſineſs. But to the *Palatine* he boaſteth leſt he ſhould be hindered, that *Vinceſlaus* (who then was offended with the *Palatinate*) unleſſe he were hindered, was neerer to it then the reſt. Thus (every one promiſing to ſubvert his enemy) he circumvents them all, and at laſt nominates his kinſman, who (if he had mentioned him before), would doubtleſs have been rejected by conſent of all parties.

CHAP. XIX.

The Argument.

Concerning Envy, and by what meanes it may be overcome.

1. OUr ſpeech muſt now be framed, and applyed to Envy, which is ſo great an evill that it needs much happineſs and fortitude, to conquer and overcome it, as that which will not be ſatisfied but with the participation and enjoyment of that thing, which it denieth to another; but every one being tenacious of, and holding faſt his owne good, is willing to labour and take paines for himſelfe, and not for others.

2. This is ſuperable, and may be overcome; though very hardly, nor to this is the communication of that good thing, we hunt after, ſimply needfull. It ſufficeth ſometimes to ſhew the envious, that the good thing which they deſire, if it remaine in our power, may be done to their profit and reputation.

3. To

3. To this end, it behooveth us to get into their friendship and familiarity; and to demonstrate to them, That although they be manifestly envious; yet we do well affect them; affirming that we will all things as they will them, nor go we about any thing whatever but that thereby we may be the fitter to serve our friends, and themselves amongst them. In brief; we must so act, that they may conceive hopes of increasing their owne fortunes, by the augments and amplifyings of our wealth and substance.

4. All haughtiness of mind, too great exceedings in costliness, unreasonable feasts & banquettings; and lastly, all boasting and bragging, are chiefly to be shunned by such, who will be cautious of being Envyed.

5. Especially by such as are raised from a mean place and office, unlesse the will of the Prince or the dignity of Office require the contrary: for then some Magnificence and sumptuous provision will not be unbeseeming, so that he manifest that he is not at such cost for his owne pleasure, but in obedience to the Princes Command.

6. By such prudence and moderation, began Cardinall *Ximenes* in a principall City: he was borne in an obscure and unknowne place, and t'was uncertaine whether noble, or not; although his fortune afterwards found those, who would affirme him noble. When he was but meane, he became a Monk; afterwards for his Endowment of mind, made confessor to *Isabella* Queen of *Castilia*, upon the recommendation of Cardinall *Mendoza*, and lastly Arch-Bishop of *Toledo*, which Arch-Bishoprick (when *Mendoza* was dead)

Isabella

Isabella having obtained from the Pope) he seeing himselfe unfit for envy, would not accept.

7. In refusing whereof he was so pertinacious, and head-strong, that though *Isabella* had submitted and subjected all the Court-Nobles he would scarce suffer himselfe to be intreated to accept of, and undertake the charge and office. And after he had consented and accepted, there was need againe of other intreaties, by which he might be induced to more ample charges and offices, and such splendor as befitted his dignity. And so retentive was he of his former way of life, that he was no otherwise wrought upon, to any alteration, then by the Authority even of the Pope himselfe. This modesty wrought well for him, and he appeased the Envy which otherwise was certainly to be expected to one, who possessed dignity, environed with so many noble Spaniards, and wealth second onely to that of kings.

8. Lastly this way of acting, as it is a notable and excellent Amulet and preservative-Pomander against Envy, under the beginnings of dignities: so it little advantageth those, who have once already carried themselves proudly; for such Moderation will seeme but feigned. An example whereof the history of Constantinople will afford. A certaine Metropolitane, by name *Constantine*, being expelled the Court of *Isacius Angelus*, and afterwards of *Alexius*, the Emperours, returned with *Euphrosyne* the Empresse, boasted of his disdaine of businesse, and a Court life, took upon him the function of a Deacon; by which to credit his dissimulation, and that he might the more instantly be courted and intreated thereto. But, in briefe,

he so craftily played his Cards, that the Emperour himselfe sent for him to Court, contrary to the ordinances of the Church, he being excluded from the Sacrament of Priest-hood, and preferred him to great offices; and (not content with his owne dignity) he brought two brothers to be at the Emperours elbow, to supply his absence, if at any time by businesse of great moment he should be called aside. But because his former fortune had too much discloted his insolency; therefore now, although seemingly modest, could he not long be credited, but afterwards being removed from Court, and never restored, he dyed.

CHAP. XX.

The Argument.

Emulation is the sister of Envy. The Remedies against it.

1. THe same remedies which do change Envy into the better, do also prevaile against Emulation which indeed hath lesse malignity in it then Envy hath, but more ambition; and is not lesse treacherous against the growth and thrivings of others.

2. But we may avert and turne aside those who are inflamed with ambition, by a specious shew of veneration, and allure and delight them with vain honours; lest they become Competitours with us, scruing up their hopes to higher things and assisting them as far as is lawfull. On the contrary, under-

undervaluing the things we affect and aime at; as below their Merits, yet sufficient for us to enterprize, as not having equall Hopes with them of greater.

3. If there be any feare that they should get before us, they may be stopt by injecting a doubt, which may be done, if (arguments being proposed on both sides,) the greater species and shew be added to those things, which are most apt to stop, and retard their ambitious courses.

4. But of all courses, that were best, if we could conceal our designes till the Emulous, or offended parties have elapsed their time, wherein they could have stopped and hindred us.

5. The suite of such as solicite too openly, is often odious to those, who acting more modestly take time to turne themselves in, and to consider they also have a conflict with greater difficulties, and are exposed to more Envy if they overcome; but if otherwise, to more reproach.

6. Farr safer is it (as is said in number 4.) to suppresse and conceale advisements, and like watermen rowing in a boat to turne the back upon the place they strive to land at.

7. They who have canvassed for the greatest Empires, have steered this Course, nothing being more usuall with them, than that (in *Euripides* his Tragedy) example of *Agamemnon*, to boast that his desires tended rather to peace, then honours. And many have been sensible, that this hath been the most wholesome remedy, and Antidote, in turning aside the plots of adversaries, and avoiding the Infamy, which abides these frustrated, and earnest Suitors. And at last they have attained

that glory, that their honour seemeth rather to be conferred on them by their own merits, then by flattering suffrages and votes of others.

8. Lastly, in atchieving honours; this chiefly must we take heed to, that we strive not with any one who is greater then our selves, and more potent then they, under whom we shelter our selves. *Manilius Lepidus* a man in the judgment of *Tacitus* most wise, will then be worthy our imitation, who being brought into the Senate by *Tiberius* with *Junius Blesus*, Uncle to *Sejanus*, that one of them might be chosen Proconsul of *Africa*, excuseth himself with his owne unhealthiness, the age of his Children, & that his daughter was marriageable, fearing doubtless that *Sejanus* would become his Enemy, if the Province had been taken before hand from *Blesus*. Annal 3.

9. Neither may we strive too obstinately with one, whom the Prince more propitiously favouring goeth about to advance, although the law favoureth us against him. For the Law doubtless is overcome by favour, as the Historian tells us, was formerly done, when *Germanicus* and *Drusus* created *Haterus Agrippa*, the kinsman of *Germanicus*, *Prætor, non obstante Lege*, the law notwithstanding. Annal 2.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXI.

The Argument.

How ruine is to be avoided, when it is imminent; how it may be handled. Examples of such as have fallen by their power.

1. Hitherto we have dispatched the chief precepts, which a politique man is to observe. If any remain, every ones prudence and dexterity may supply them. And although they serve not only to acquire and get, but also, to keep and maintain Courtly power; yet will it not be useleſſe, to have in readineſſe the examples of such who have fallen by their power and greatneſſe; that we may be wiſe by others perils, and if we cannot shun ruine, at leaſt we may learn to prepare our ſelves for it. For this laſt is not leſſe neceſſary then the other. Sithence he who indeavoureth a flight, oftimes aſſayeth in vain; he who prepares for a fall (inevitable to moſt whom fortune mounteth on high) renders it the more gentle and ſupportable.

2. Such chances often happen, either by our own default, or by the Arts, and devices of envious Enemies or Competitors, or by the perverſneſs of the Princes inclination, or finally, by his death.

3. Since all mens lives are prone to lapſe and repleat with errors, chiefly theirs, who live loftily, and by reaſon of their Authority (by which they who are neer to them, are conſtrained to ap-

prove all their Actions, whether good or bad) are set without, and beyond the chance of the Dice, and danger of reprehension.

4. But above all others, that's the baseſt treason when men rise up against their Prince, the Author of their dignity and honour, a note and character of an ungratefull mind and unfaithfulnesse, a filthy crime, and the most just matter and subject of a Prince's Odium and indignation.

5. Let such men as are advanced to great dignity, fly the very shadow and appearance of this wickednesse: and for that end, let them not move the Prince to the least suspition, and let them decline those honours which may seem opportune, and seasonable, by evill endeavours.

6. *Paterculus* adjudged *Sejanus* the most prudent of Courtiers; and indeed he ought to have been so, who could flourish in favour under that same crafty, and distrustfull *Tiberius*.

7. In acting (saith he) he was like one asleep revengefull of nothing done to himself, and so obtaining all things, scruing himselfe into the esteem of others; calme and undisturbed in countenance and life, but restlesse in mind. And yet on this crafty and subtill peece had Ambition so got hold, that he aspired to the Empire. For that end first he desired intermarriage with *Livia* the widdow of *Drusus*, whereby being allyed to the house of the *Cæsars*, he might the more facilitate his desire. And although his request was suspected by *Tiberius*, as he might guesse by his tergiversation and refusall; he never yet changed his minde: but

because

becauſe this ſucceeded not, he attempted another way.

8. He well knew that the City diſdained *Tiberius*, and therefore, while he was wavering, he eggeth him forward, and perſwades him to betake himſelf to *Capreas* his magnificent Tower neer *Naples*. Of this matter, *Tacitus* in the fourth of his Annals, ſaith thus. Leaſt by driving away the troops which dayly came to his houſe, he ſhould infringe his power, or by receiving them, give way to criminations, he bent this way, to force *Tiberius* to live in pleaſant and delightfull places, far remote from *Rome*. He provided many things, he held addreſſes and acceſſes in his own hands; he intercepted Letters often which were conveyed to and fro by the Souldiers; when as *Cæſar* growing into years, and lying quiet, and at eaſe in a ſecret place, would, he thought, ere long, tranſmit the charge of the Empire to him with more facility. Nor did his hope altogether deceive him, for in ſhort ſpace, under the ſhew of helping *Tiberius* in his old age, he got almoſt all the ſtrength of the Empire into his owne hands.

9. Nevertheleſs, that this way which *Sejanus* tooke had more of hazard in it then expedition, the Sequel will declare: which more exactly to commemorate will be a worke well worthy our labour, to the end that both our Courtiers may be better cautionated, in ruling and governing their own fortunes; and Princes in promoting of others.

10. *Sejanus* was either more indeered unto, or more endured by *Tiberius*, when he found his help

usefull in repressing *Agrippina*, and her sons *Nero* and *Drusus*. In which villany, *Sejanus* shewed himself very prompt and ready, knowing that thereby he should not only hoise up sayle, and have a speedy voyage to the Prince's favour, but also establish his hopes for future power and greatness, there being none remaining of *Cæsar's* house but those two youths; whose tender Age, if they had accepted the chief Regiment and Government, had left to him the Authority and mannagement of affairs, till opportunity would serve him, to usurpe and possess the Supream style and Title.

11. But observe how precipitate and heady Ambition makes men! He sees not by that how much the neerer he was to the height, by so much the more was he suspected by the diffidency of the Prince; and that the course he takes would rather diminish him, then further his progresse. He hunts counter; for when nothing, save the name of Emperour (which yet many were ready to afford him) and the power of a Triune, (which title being the top and Pinacle of Honour and dignity, the Emperours did challenge as due soly to themselves) was wanting to him; not content therewith, he strives to exaggerate and heape up his power, to a greater bulke and breadth; And by this (as he renders himself venerable to all, so) he brought himself under suspect with *Tiberius*.

12. He therefore, when he perceived that not only the Prætorian bands, but many of the Senators and Principall Families, (partly by benefits and hope, and partly by fear) were addicted and devoted

devoted to *Sejanus*; and that his own secrets were carried, and disclosed by his own domesticks to *Sejanus*, and the like not done to him of the matters of *Sejanus*; by and by, plotted and contrived his ruine and destruction, as of an Emulator, and one contending to outvie him. But before he would set upon any action, thought fit to try how some stood affected towards him, that so he might distinguish from the rest, who would approve his designe and advise him in it.

13. And lest *Sejanus* should smell out *Cæsars* intention, he makes him a Consul, and in his presence, and also by Letters to the Statesmen and people, styles him his friend in Labours; at length feigneth himself sick, that so he might sound the affection of *Sejanus*, and others towards him.

14. Sometimes he writes to the Senate more cheerfully of his health, and that he would come shortly into the City. Sometimes commends and applaudes *Sejanus*; another while depresseth him; receiving some upon his recommendation; spurning at others, that so he might keep him ambiguous, and doubtfull betwixt hope and fear.

15. Who, (whether yet imboldned by favour, or but of fear) determines to act nothing forcibly, lest he should hazard all his hopes, hoping that his petty trespasses against the Prince (if any were) would in time be raced and blotted out of memory. Some, mean while hitherto following rather *Sejanus* his fortune then himself, seeing the mutability of *Tiberius*, begin to act more cautiously

tiously the affection of others towards him by little and little, withers and growes stale.

15. *Tiberius*, having a good while since taken a clear prospect of the proud and lofty mind of *Sejanus*; and also mistrusting, lest his designe, being stirred up by contempt, should be frustrated, by running the hazard of fortune and chance, commanded, it should be noised abroad, that he intended to deliver over the Tribunician power and authority to *Sejanus*. A little while after, by Letters to the Senate, which were carried by *Macro*, (who was Provost of the Pretorian Bands) he commands him to be committed to prison. *Macro* having entred the City, before day, acquainted first *Memmius Regulus*, then a Consul, (for the other Consul was more inclined to *Sejanus*) with the Prince's mandat, which afterwards he shewes to *Grecinus Laco*, then Captain of the Watch. From thence going towards the Senate-house, he accidentally accosteth *Sejanus*, who being troubled in his thoughts, enquires whether he had any Letters for him from *Tiberius*: He whispereth him in the ear, that by and by he must be saluted a Tribune; who being tickled with secret joy, enters the Court. *Macro* dismisses the Pretorian Attendants, shews by Letters, that it is the Emperours pleasure it should be so, and that thereby they are promised a donative. *Macro* having ordained *Laco*'s Band to the Pretorian Attendants, who were now dismissed, entring the Senate-house, offers the Letters; and anon, (not expecting the reading of them) charges *Laco* diligently to watch, lest *Sejanus* breaking out of the Court, should raise a tu-

tumult, himself going to the Pretorian Attendants, and prohibites them from attempting any thing.

17. The Letters which were then read being somewhat large, afforded *Macro* time enough, to provide necessaries, and were wonderfully interlaced and contrived. In the beginning, not a word of *Sejanus*, but of other matters; by and by hee's nipt, but very lightly; after this, (some other things being interwoven) followes a high accusation; and yet but perfunctorily and sleightly touched. At length, (after many digressions about the publick affairs) two of *Sejanus* his familiars are nominated, whom the Senate are commanded to animadvert and consider, with this addition, that he himself should be apprehended; no mention was made of any course to be taken for his death, that so, hopes might be left to the accused, to purge him of the crimes, which were therefore objected but as leight matters.

18. The Letters being read, many of those who had brought him into the Senate-house, (when they perceived the businesse to be far otherwise, then that *Sejanus* should receive the power of a Tribune) began to rise up, and encompassed *Sejanus*, lest he should slink away, which was thought he would have done, if the beginning of the Letters had thundred more sharply against him. But contemning those petty and sleight nips and twinges, he stirrs not from his place; and being called upon twice or thrice by *Memmius* the Consul, he scarcely submitted; so insolent and haughty was he grown.

19. When

19. When he was risen up, *Laco* first followes him; afterwards *Regulus*, accompanied with other of the Senators, brought him out of the Court into the Prison, where afterwards he was condemned by the Senate, *ad scalas Gemonias*, which was a place appointed, from whence condemned men were thrown down.

20. Behold here the end and destruction of a Courtier, who had scarce his peer within the memory of man, for craftinesse and power; whose structure and building, although as to the whole, and continuance of it, seems to be due to *Tiberius*, yet may rather be ascribed to the destiny of such power, as commonly, by reason of its own heap and bignesse, falls so much the lower, by how much the higher and loftier it thrusts up it self; according to that saying, *Tolluntur in altum & lapsu graviore ruant.*

21. This may be learnt from the example of *Perennius*, whom (striving to get up to this height by *Seianus* his Arts and devices) *Commodus*, although farre inferiour to *Tiberius* in ingenuity and witt, subverted and overthrew.

22. Perhaps these relations may not move many men, because they seeme to themselves to bee wiser then others, and to know some things which was unknown to those whose chances are here related; And truly, there have been some in these latter Ages, to whom this businesse hath succeeded not altogether so unhappily, such as *Boyla* was, (of whom we may reade in the History of *Constantinople*) who being found to have conspired against *Constantine Monomachus* the Emperour, suffered not such exquisite, and heavy punishment

niſhment as others in like caſes had done, becauſe he fell into the hands of a mild and placable Prince.

23. But we are willing here briefly to recite that ſtory, from which may be underſtood, That Counſells even the moſt ſecret, and ſuch as to humane eyes are not paſſable, oftimes by divine Providence, and even by unhoped for meanes are detected and diſcovered, and cannot avoid their puniſhment, although handled with never ſo much craftineſſe and ſubtilty.

24. No mortall could have beleeved, that this *Boyla* had had, either aptitude and fitnes, or ſubſequent cauſe for ſuch a villany. The greatneſſe of the benefits wherewith hee had adorned and beautified him, had wrought an opinion in the Prince of his fidelity, for otherwiſe he ſeemed ſimple to any great matters; for he was not only borne in a low and meane place, but alſo was of ſuch a buffling, fumbling, and cumbred ſpeech, that he could ſcarce be underſtood, and when he perceived that it delighted the Emperor, he afterwards induſtrioufly affected it.

25. By this aſſentation and ſoothing, he ſo far inſinuated into the Prince's familiarity, that he had admittance even to the privy, and bed-chamber of *Conſtantine*. At length, being enriched by the Prince, and elected into the number of the Senators, he began to ſhute out his hopes to a higher flight, and went ſo far, that he thought, by the ruine and deſtruction of the Prince, he might find a way to the Scepter it ſelf. He firſt opens himſelf to thoſe, whom he knew were offended with the Prince, and promiſeth largely to thoſe, who

who approve and associate their aids, commending the refusers for their good-will to their Prince, and made shew, as if he were but an explorator, and private spy, to try their faithfulness and loyalty.

26. While these things were in agitation, he shunned the conscience of all men, save those whom he feared not; and had done the bloody act, had he not been discovered by one of his own comerades and counsellors, and by his art deprehended, having the very weapon in his hand, which he had sharpned to kill the Prince withall. The Emperour bore the injury so mildly, that he accounted it enough, that some of the conspirators were put to death; but the Ring-leader and Captain he onely banished.

27. It would be too tedious, to bring in here all those, who in Courts have been shipwrackt; such, I say, as by such offences have merited punishment; and which have hapned, not onely to the manifest authors of such wickedness, but even to such, as have been suspected of the thoughts thereof. But we'l content our selves, with producing these, and onely add this, That all Pride, whether it offend the Prince by ambition, or boasting, upbraiding, malediction, or reviling; by splendour, or too great a retinue, is the high road to destruction and ruine.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

The Argument.

Bragging and boasting before the Prince, reproaching and twitting with offices, liberty, arrogancy, too much familiarity, pride, vanity, avarice, perfidiousnesse, conspiracy, sowing of dissention and strife, are every one of them denoted by their examples.

BOasting and upbraiding of Offices, in the Court of *Alexander* the Great, lost *Philotas* and *Clytus*; *Craterus* also, was almost blown up with the same winds. Certes, he had longer stood affected with the Prince, had he contained himself within the bounds of noble and generous modesty.

2. Thus *Caius Sylius* with *Tiberius*: *Antonius* the first, with *Vespasian*; *Syllas* with King *Agrippa*, publishing aforehand their offices and employments, deprived themselves of all the fruit and benefit of them; concerning the first of whom, *Tacitus*, in the 4th. of his Annalls; and *Josephus* in his 4th. History, touching the last, are to be inspected and looked into.

3. Princes believe, that their fortune is destroyed, by such kind of boastings; which fortune they will have seem to be due to themselves, not to the merits or vertue of their subjects.

4. A lust and desire of reprehending the actions of Princes, and a freedom of inveighing against

againſt others before the Prince, is to be avoided, as the neighbour to arrogancy. *Eumenes*, petulantly and ſaucily, complaining before *Alexander* of *Hepheſtion*, that he aſſigned to Stage-players, and ſuch kind of fellowes, the Souldiers quarters, incurred the diſpleaſure of the King.

5. To be too familiarly buſie about the Prince, or to boaſt ones ſelf, the ſole Arbitrator and Commiſſioner of principall charges, ſavoureth, if not of pride, yet certainly vanity; and covetouſneſſe ſometimes crouds it ſelf in with it. Many examples of ſuch are extant every where, in Hiſtories. How immodeſtly did *Zotirus* demean and carry himſelf, under *Heliogbalus*? how did *Turinus* under *Alexander*, the ſon of *Mammea*? One whereof was by the Emperour's command ſuffocated with ſmoak, uſing a more uncouth and harſh fortune then the former, it ſeeming juſt, *ut, qui fumum vendiderat, fumo puniretur*, That he who had vended and ſold ſmoak, ſhould periſh by ſmoak. The other was wont to boaſt, that the Prince was ruled by his advice, and alſo made advantage, by ſelling favours, when the courteſie was no way advantagious to the purchaſer.

6. Worthy in the firſt place to be remembered, is the arrogancy of *Plancianus*, which alſo was accompanied with vanity, and at length broke out into treachery: He was of that arrogancy, that he durſt oppoſe himſelf againſt *Baſſianus*, the Emperours ſon, the author of his dignity and fortune: Moreover alſo, ſo vain, that paſſing through the City, he would not onely preclude others from addreſſes to him, but almoſt from having

having a view of him; and had some to go before him, to turn those whom they met, out of his way. At length proved traitor to his Prince; and being found guilty of manifest conspiracy, lost his head for his pains.

7. *Philip* the fair reigning in *France*, *Enguerrandus Marigny*, presuming to confront *Carolus Valesius*, how miserably he perished, together with others, is observed out of the French Histories.

8. Before all things also in Courts, we ought to beware, that we lend not our help to the sowing of discord amongst Princes; for they being reconciled to each other, do mostly sacrifice such persons to their friendship. Which thing is made good, both by many examples, in the Histories of all Nations, and also by that memorable example of *Otho Crondorferus*, which the History of *Bavaria* supplies us withal. He was in flourishing favour with *Radulphus* the Palatine, and was the author of the enmities between him and his mother: At length, the mother ingratiates her self with her son; but *Crondorferus* was rewarded, with the losse and deprivation, both of his tongue and eyes.

CHAP. XXIII.

The Argument.

How a man may conserve the Prince's benevolence, and the good will of such as are in favour with him.

1. WE ought not therefore to crosse or resist Princes themselves onely, but even not such as are in favour with them, and are more prevalent then our selves.

2. This Counsell *Germanicus* when he dyed gave to *Agrippina*; whereof *Tacitus* speakes in the 2. of his Annals, thus: Then turning to his wife (sayeth he) he intreateth her by the memory of himselfe, and the Children they had between them, that she should put off cruelty and fiercenesse, and submit her mind to rigorous fortune; least returning back to the City, she should stirre up, and provoke, such as were more powerfull then herselfe, through emulation. This precept being sleighted by *Agrippina*, ruined both her, and her children. We spake a little before, of that which was the diminution and shortning of *Eumenes* his favour with *Alexander*, that behaving himselfe too irreverently and unseemly in the Prince's presence, when he came to complain of *Hephæstion*, he even wove himselfe, (through the Complaint) into the web of Envy.

3. Therefore, when we see any one flourish by the grace and favour of the Prince; we ought carefully to waigh our Authority, if we have any,

any, in the ballance with theirs, and try whose is most ponderous. And in the Examen and tryall thereof, not to attend so much to the externall species and shadow; but to the importance and weight of interiour and inward causes.

4. *Craterus* and *Hephæstion* seemed once to be both in great and equall favour with *Alexander*, till *Alexander* himselfe made the difference; when he calls the one, *Amicum Regis*, the friend of the King; the other *Amicum Alexandri* the friend of *Alexander*; for upon this speech, *Craterus* could make this observation and judgment, That Princes being commonly more addicted to their pleasure, then their owne dignity and honour, do hold, and account them most deere unto them, who do love and embrace *Alexanders*, that is themselves; then those who do court, and admire the fortune of Kings. And although there arose a dissention afterwards between him and *Hephæstion*, whereby the whole Court was divided into parties; *Alexander* shewed himselfe addicted and tied to neither party, but chid both; and threatned to punish them, if hereafter they put him to the like trouble. In this kind of decision which *Alexander* here useth, he manifested, not so much his equall and indifferent affection towards them both; as a singular and most especial kind of prudence in Princes, very much to be imitated. This discord and difference, he sees, may produce many troubles; neither was he ignorant that *Craterus* his wonderfull Authority, with the Macedonians; and his owne favour towards *Hephæstion* was envyed, and bred displeasure against himselfe: he therefore blames *He-*

phasion for his envy. [illegible] publique; and chides *Craterus* privately, lest the Macedonians should be offended.

5. Amongst those, who in the examination of Princely benevolence and favour, have either been more neglective, or being devoid of reason have been more unexperienced and unskilfull, *Antonius Primus* deserves to be listed, who (presumeing to contend with *Mutianus*) learnt at length, That it was more destructive to him that he had disdained *Mutianus*, then if he had despised *Vespasian*.

6. Now, that Princes do more sharply revenge an injury done to their Ministers, then to themselves, is a thing attested by Examples almost in all Courts, the cause whereof *Dio* sifted out; after he had declared the same to have happened in the case of *Sejanus*.

7. Even as they, (saith he) whom virtue and their known merits, have dignified and exalted, do not very much stand upon, and esteem or heed the vanities of their honours, and the outward marks and expressions of worship and reverence: So on the contrary, they, who by Ambition endeavour to raise themselves from the ground and dust, and to cover their domestick and covetous briberies, do take it very hainously, and interpret it presently a contempt, if you neglect the least matter or punctillio of homage, or good turne towards them. So much the more difficult is it therefore, to conserve and hold fast the benevolence of such, then of the Prince himselfe. For he counts it his glory to pardon an injury, but they, (that they may not seeme to remit, what they

they cannot vindicate) not onely straine their power in persecuting their enemies, but ostentate and boast of such their doings.

CHAP. XXIIII.

The Argument.

Pride denoted and observed by Examples in men, of the most inferiour Ranck and Condition under Princes. Treachery and perfidiousnesse against the Prince in disclosing his secrets, is forged and compacted of many Monstrous, and unnaturall courses and designes.

1. AND not onely hath an insolent, and haughty carriage and deportment, been destructive and mischievous to Nobles and great ones: but even to men of the most inferiour and base degree. John king of *Arragon* so fondly and fervently loved *Alvarus* de *Luna* (the son of a former king of *Arragon*, but borne out of wedlocke) that he would commit to him the chief affaires, and even the kingly dignity; his Nobles in vaine resisting. But when he being lifted up with pride in this prosperous fortune, had precipitated and thrust down head-long a Noble man, who in the kings name had admonished him of his duty, himselfe by the kings Command, lost his head for his paines.

2. This hath been in Court, the frequent cause of such Ship-wrack; when any hath rendred either himselfe, or the Prince odious to the people, or to the chief of the nation. For either the Prince

himselfe to free him from envy, will cast such a one off; or else others will rout him, and destroy him.

3. While *Commodus* was Emperour, *Cleander* had armed the Pretorian Companies against the people of Rome. This bred Rome so many troubles and tumults, that (had not the Emperour himselfe sacrificed *Cleander* to the peoples fury), he could not have been secure.

4. The same *Commodus* had incurred the odium and hatred of all men, for the love of one *Anterus*; from whom that they might deliver their Master, some of those Ministers, who well affected *Commodus*, met *Anterus* upon a time as he returned from Court; and slew him.

5. *Eutropius* being (amongst a few others) a long time beloved of *Arcadius* the Emperour, when he was but believed to be the Author of the sedition moved by *Tribigildus*; was delivered up by the Prince to his Enemies, as a price of peace and quietnesse.

6. Amongst those evills, which subvert and overthrow Courtiers; that unfaithfulness is not to be passed by, which bewrayeth the secrets of the Prince, and imparts them to his enemy. That of *Sylla*, as it was horrible, so was it notorious by the destruction of many others, and hammered and forged with many Monstrous and prodigious actions, (to wit) with lightnesse and unconstancy, imprudence and lacke of heed, vanity and infidelity; I may add, with a desire of getting money, unjust honour, Revenge, Curiosity, and other restlesse troubles.

7. As to the secret of Princes, I esteeme it best that

that they make choice of such, as are not cleft, and full of chincks and crannyes, so as to vent and let out those secrets they impart to them; seeing they fly onely to them to be admitted into their Consciences and private thoughts. For if thou alone be knowing; and yet fame and report, which is ingenious and cunning at conjecture and guessing, shall by chance spread abroad something like that committed to thy secrecy; thou wilt not avoid suspition, but he will judge his Secret to issue out from thee; And although the Prince (it may be) hath by chance opened the same thing to another, yet possibly he may forget it; or more confide in the others silence and secrecy, and the blame be nevertheless laid on thee.

8. Not without cause was *Philippides* the Comick poet (amongst the chief) deere unto king *Lysimachus*, who being asked what he would wish to be made partaker of, by the Prince; answered, That he would refuse nothing that came from him, so long as he might be free from the knowledge of his secrets. Let us follow, as much as may be, his example, and count it safer, to be unknowing of his Secret, as a thing hard to be kept, then to be acquainted therewith.

9. *Hiero* Prince of *Syracusa* said, that they who revealed the secrets of Princes were injurious; in that they exposed others, aswell as themselves, to the odium and loathing of the Prince.

CHAP. XXV.

The Argument.

The causes, kinds, and examples of Conspiracies with the enemies of a Prince.

1. BEsides this, most doubtfull of all, is the fortune of those, who being driven thereto, either by avarice, or ambition, or by desire to prop up their own security, conspire with a Prince's Enemies, either extraneous and forraigne, or domestique.

2. Cardinal *Balæus*, the Son of a Botcher, being made Treasurer by *Lewis* the 11. was also from that preferred to a Bishoprick, from thence by the intercession of the King, and the accord of the *Pope* (who indeavoured to confer a Benefite on him whom he had hitherto experienced to be his adversary) attained to Cardinal Dignity. But afterwards being found to have conspired with the Kings foes, was imprisoned by the space of 12 years, from whence at length the prayers and intercession of *Pope Sixtus* the 4th only, freed him.

3. For the like crime, Cardinall *Pratensis* in the Reign of *Francis* the first, underwent the like punishment, who perhaps had never been released from Prison, but that afterwards drinking his own Urine, he deceived the Physitians by dissembling the Strangury. For the King fearing the *Popes* anger, if the Cardinall by that Malady should have been consumed, set him at Liberty.

4. *Peter*

4. *Peter de Vineis* being a privy Counsellor to the Emperour *Frederick* the second; and being suspect of conspiracy with *Pope Alexander* the third being the Emperours Enemy, lost his eyes by it.

5. Not only the Counsels of *Stilico* (the Father in Law of *Honorius* the Emperour) to enjoy the Orientall Empire, but his occult and secret commerce with *Alaricus* King of the *Goths*, are beleived to have procured and caused his death; which thing that Ignominious peace and League which he entred into with *Alaricus*, although the Senate withstood and did oppugne it, doth confirme. *Lampadius*, who also himself cryed out against it, calls it not a Peace, but a Paction of Servitude, by which the Emperour was constrained to become tributary to the *Barbarians*.

CHAP. XXVI.

The Argument.

A Polititian may not be the Author of ambiguous Counsels: After what sort Consults of undertaking Warre, and breaking Leagues may be instituted. How great a variety there is of those errors: for which Courtiers fall away from their reputation, and favour with the Prince.

1. FIrst also, our Polititian whom we instruct, must beware, that he be not the Author of ambiguous Counsels; the unhappy issue of these, will be imputed to the Adviser, but the prosperous

rous succesſe, to the fortune and good hap of the Prince, not only by the vulgar who judge of all things by their event; but by the Prince himſelf; who will be glad that he hath one, on whom he may derive the Envy of unhappy Counſell.

2. While *Stilico* was living, and after his death, there was but one Argument and ſubject matter of wailing and complaining amongſt the people, to wit, the peace which he had made with the *Goths*. *Olympius* who had procured the Ruine of *Stilico*, ſtriving to be famous by contrary wayes, broke off the League of peace, *Alaricus* in vain objecting Right and Equity; War being begun, for ſometime contrary to Augury and divination; he being accounted in the judgment of the vulgar the Author of all their Evills was at length accuſed by the Eunuches, who were very gratious with the Emperour, and leaving the Court fled into *Dalmatia*.

3. When the buſineſſe was of undertaking a Warre or breaking the League, the Miniſters and furtherers in this buſineſſe are made parties; they only bring arguments on both ſides, and leave the choice of either to the arbitrement of the Prince: not with ſtanding, if they were conſtrained to deliver their opinions they would conclude it ſafer to incline to peace, unleſs very Neceſſity or manifeſt and apparent Utility, perſwaded the contrary.

4. *Jovius*, the Succeſſor of *Olympius*, of whom we have ſpoken, wiſely proſecutes the buſineſſe: for he being more prone to War, that ſo he might be more neceſſary to the Prince, did nevertheleſſe

as

as the Politick custome of some is, prefer the love of Peace. Meeting at *Rhemes* to parly with *Alaricus* he sends those conditions which *Alaricus* had proposed to *Honorius*, perswading him apart by other Letters, to offer the command of the Armies to *Alaricus*, by which he might be made more equall and indifferent for other things. The Emperour denying that it was besides his businesse to commit the itresse thereof to a forrainer, and one who was yet an Enemy, answered that he had rather consent to became tributary.

5. These Letters when *Jovius* had read before *Alaricus*, he being wroth, that himself, and his, were contemned by *Honorius*, broke off this uncertain web and worke of the Paction and Agreement: *Jovius* returnes to *Honorius*, who himself being offended with the insolency of his Enemy, sweares not to have peace with *Alaricus*, and with the same Oath binds all his party. Thus *Jovius* by the same subtilty and craftinesse, both removes the envy of the Truce-breakings from himself, and obliges *Alaricus* by the testification of his good will; whereby he would have had him been made the Tribune of *Cæsars* Armies; but infolded *Honorius* in War: which thing wonderfully established the Authority and Power of *Jovius*.

6. There is such great variety in Histories, of those Errors and faults, for which Courtiers fall into disfavour with Princes, that no man by any diligence can so collect them all, but that when he hath quoted many, he will yet seem to have omitted more. Wherefore the most principall only being rasted, we will leave the rest to every ones industry and prudence. CHAP.

CHAP. XXVII.

The Argument.

By what wiles a Courtier may be suppressed, by malevolent persons: First, That either he may go from Court himself, under some pretence; or else be speciously removed. Of such, who by the same Art, are called up out of the Provinces.

WE have seen how by his own default, a Courtier may fall into the displeasure of a Prince. We will now shew the means, by which his foes, such as are envious, or emulous, may depresse and abase him: For, they may endeavour to remove him from Court, upon some pretext not dishonourable; or may render him suspected or hated to the Prince; or lastly, in a publick and open manner, constrain the Prince to remove him.

2. The way of Amolition, or removing, which we said was the first way, hath divers means, and various ends; for some, out of a shew of honour, or occasion to live with some friends, and neer allies, are induced, not unwillingly, to withdraw themselves from Court. This way *Stippiota* craftily used, (when *Manuel Comnenus* was Emperour) to remove *Hagiotheodorita*, who stood in his light; for there being a difference between *Michael* the Pedagogue, and *Josephus Balsamon*, *Stippiota* perswaded the Emperour, that if *Hagiotheodorita*, *Balsamons* kinsman, were made Governour of *Peloponnesus*, the difference would become-

composed. *Hagiotheodorita* being glad of an opportunity to help his kinsman, accepteth the courtesie; little minding, that *Stippiota* alone, would in the interim (his Competitor being removed) have the ordering and managing of the chief affairs of the Empire, which also came to passe.

3. Some men, being wearied with the contentions & brablings of adversaries in Court, betake themselves unto any Province whatsoever, upon pretext of necessary departing thence. Thus did *Agrippa*, who (as *Velleius* testifieth) went into *Asia*, pretending some principall businesse; but, as report went, for some private grudge between him and *Marcellus*, withdrew himself from the present time.

4. *Tiberius* (while *Caius Cæsar* was yet alive, who envyed him) departed to *Rhodes*, pretending to turn Student there, and (as *Suetonius* saith) by his mothers means, obtained, that to cover his reproach, he might make shew, as if he had gone Ambassadour thither.

5. If he whom you desire to remove, have no pretence to get leave to withdraw, and will not take it as a courtesie, that he may depart willingly, and without compulsion, you may perswade the Prince to prefer him, to some charge and office, upon this account, that none is more worthy or fit for such an employment.

6. After the same manner do emulous and envious persons, desire to have such abstracted and drawn from a Province, or subdued Country, whose authority they endeavour to weaken, whom they labour to bring into Court, as necessary

ceſſary and uſefull to the Prince, and to thruſt him into the croud of Courtiers, by whoſe loftineſſe, he may be the more obſcured and clouded.

7. This was the artifice and trick, which *Apelles* uſed with *Polybius*, when he went about to deprive *Taurio* of the government of *Peloponneſus*.

8. So *Darius* (by the advice of *Megabyzus*) called back *Hyeſteus* from the government of *Jonia*, a Region of *Greece*; not becauſe there was need of his preſence, but that he might infringe and leſſen his power and greatneſſe.

9. If theſe Courtiers were content to enlarge their own place and bounds, by the removing of another, and would ſtop there, the comparing of others far worſe, would render this Art tolerable; but for the moſt part, they ſtick not here.

10. When *Conſtantius* was Emperour, *Sylvanus* being Commander of the Infantry, (as *Ammianus Marcellus* reports) by the procurement of *Arbetius*, is ſent into *France*, to correct and amend thoſe miſchiefs, wherewith the Barbarous people had infeſted the French; as one emulous, and that could not endure to ſee any one quiet, and out of trouble; declines ſo great and hazardous a work, and turns it upon another. *Sylvanus* undertaking the journey, and having ingratiated with the French, became thereby powerfull. Afterwards *Arbetius* compileing envy againſt him, with the Emperour, was at length himſelf brought to ruine.

11. The ſame fortune almoſt had *Urſicinus*, Commander of the Cavalry, under the ſame Empe-

Emperour: One *Eusebius* an Eunuch, with many other Courtiers, had conspired his death; by the machinations and devices of these conspirators, he is sent into the borders of *Persia*, that so he might be at distance from Court, where having continued by the space of ten years, he receives for his successor *Sabinianus*, a man, who neither for wit nor experience, was comparable to him, for such a charge. By and by, (a rumour being raised, that the Persians made ready for war) he is commanded to stay there, having delivered up his power to the other; *Eusebius* purposely so disposing the matter, that so *Sabinianus* should challenge to himself, the prosperous event of the war against the Persians, and that the adverse and ill fortune thereof might be imputed to *Ursicinus*, which the event afterwards confirmed: For *Ursicinus* being dejected for anothers fault, spent the remainder of his life in private. You may see if you please, *chap.* 30. *numb.* 5.

12. The times of the same *Constantius* will supply us with another example; for *Ruffinus*, the uncle of *Gallus*, by the fathers side, being President of the Pretorian bands, was sent to appease the sedition of the Souldiery, with no other intention, then that he might perish amongst the hatefull hands of those mad and peevish people. For the same end, *Clytus* complains, that he was sent by *Alexander* against the Sogni-ans.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXVIII.

The Argument.

The second way, is; Calumnies and Commendations are made use of, to make others suspected and hatefull to the Prince. Touching Detraction, Examples.

THus much concerning Amolition and removing, as the primary means and way, which is used by enemies, and envious and emulous persons, to bring others into disfavour with their Prince and Soveraigne. The second is, that whereby they render men suspected and odious to the Prince, by the help of detractions and calumnies, or else by commendations.

2. In Calumnies we must attend unto two things; First, Whether they be fit and sufficient to change the Prince's will. Secondly, Whether they have a likenesse to truth. Of the first, judgment is to be made, both by the present state of affairs, and also, by the genius and inclination of the Prince, and the very nature and condition of negotiations.

3. No calumnies do abound with more ruines of great men, then such as do accuse and impeach them, of machinations and plots, against the Prince, and his rule and government, or of contempt and disdaining to obey him, or such as are of detracting speech, and mocking or scorning the Prince's words or actions.

4. Calumnies, and false accusations, are then rendred

rendred probable and likely, if the accusation, which makes the party accused guilty, be branded with a note of arrogancy, either in the words or actions of themselves, or else of their servants, friends, parents, or those who are tied and obliged to them, by necessity or alliance. If they be supposed to have counterfeited Letters, the judgment and sentence will be such, as that which the Prince hath already conceived in his mind, even the faithfulnesse of the calumniator, and the guiltinesse of the party accused.

5. Those things which by calumny are wrested into a crime, are such, as the party traduced is said to have spoken, or done; either spontaneously, and of his own accord, or else being induced by the deceits and circumventings of enemies, or envious persons. Such wits, by allurements and enticeing words, can fetch and pump up things that are not; and in every matter, find occasion and opportunity, wherewith to help themselves.

6. There are some, who having counselled and perswaded a man to do something; when they have found him yield, they make this the very weapon of their accusation, and feigne, that he hath attempted some horrible designe against the Prince.

7. A certain Magician a Monk, one *Santabarinus* by name, was (before others) beloved by *Basilius*, Emperour of *Constantinople*, but envyed beyond measure by *Leo* his son: And therefore, having endeavoured by all obsequious readinesse of feigned devotion, to allure his good-will, at length wrought the young man to credulity:

For afterwards, (having gotten some credit with him) he advises *Leo*, to wear a dagger for his defence, privately, under his Mandilion or Jacket, if at any time he went out to hunting with his father. Following his instruction, the Magician goes to his father, and feignes to him, that his son had privately conceived parricide, and shewes the Dagger, as a detection and token thereof, which he, watching his opportunity, had carried about him. To be brief, the matter was so handled, that the son was imprisoned; and although protected with the most intensive and vehement prayers and entreaties of the Nobility, he scarcely escaped punishment.

8. In the time of *Valentinian* the Emperour, *Ætius* accuseth *Boniface* his companion, (who was very deer to the Emperour, and made Governour of *Africa*) of treachery against *Placidia*, the Prince's mother, and that he intended to subject *Africa* to himself; advising also, that he might be speedily recalled thence. At the same time, he admonisheth *Boniface* by Letters, that he was accused at Court, and upon that account recalled; but bade him yet take heed of comming back, lest he should be an enemy to his own safety. *Boniface* giving credit to these things, so far disobeyed the Empereſſes recalling him, that she agreed with *Gontarus*, King of the *Vaſiduli*, and *Genſericus* his son, then manageing the affairs in *Spain*, to reduce him, if he opposed by force; who by this occasion, possessed themselves of *Mauritania*. At length, the cheat being discovered, *Placidia* permitted, that after the custom of that age, a Duell should be appointed, wherein

in *Ætius* being conquered, he was commanded to avoid the Court.

9. Not unlike to this was the subtilty and wilinesse of *Samonas*, who being deerly beloved to *Leo* the son of *Basilius* the Emperour; for detecting the Conspiracy of one *Basilius* a kinsman of *Zoa* the Empresse, who would have destroyed *Andronicus* being chosen Chieftaine, together with *Amerinus Logotheta* against the *Saracens*; he wills his friends to admonish him by Letters, that he should beware of *Hymerius*; who came with an intention to accuse him (exoculation, and depriving of the sight, was a sort of punishment in that age, wherewith principall men, and those whose power they thought fit to abate and weaken, were afflicted and chastised) *Andronicus* believeing these things to be of truth, which were but feigned by *Samonas*: having made his escape from *Hymerius*, possesseth himselfe of a certaine Castell. This hindered not *Samonas* to exaggerate and heape up businesse against him to the Emperour, and by his perswasions, an army is sent, which drives *Andronicus* together with the *Saracens* from the confines of the Empire.

10. We have a little before (Chap. 27. *Numb* 10) made mention of *Arbetius*. It seemes worth observation how he superaddeth Treachery upon treachery. When he sees that *Constantius* was offended with *Silvanus*, and doubted least he coming to Rome, should obliterate and wipe off the Criminations objected against him, he takes care that the Emperours Letters (by which he calls *Silvanus* unto him) might be committed to the charge of one *Apodemius*. He coming into France, and

suppressing the Letters, tells him that he was in very imminent danger. Here upon *Silvanus* moving sedition as a remedy and cure of his owne safety, imprudently and unawares verified the Calumination.

11. But truly we have too long been silent concerning *Sejanus*; who, as he was wonderfully crafty in all things, so was he not unaccustomed to this Art whereof we now treate. That he might render *Agrippina* the more suspected to *Tiberius*, he suborneth his friends, that they might puff up and increase her hopes beyond what was lawfull. Her neighbours also are provoked and inticed, to stimulate and prick forward the haughty and smelling spirits of *Agrippina*, by depraved and stubborne words and speeches. Himselfe being the Engineere and contriver of the plot, *Claudia Pulchra* Neice to *Agrippina* is accused and slandered; to the end that *Agrippina* complaining hereof, and being a woman, hot and fell, ill able to beare a discontentment, might the more vehemently and sharply touch and gaule the suspicious mind of the Emperour.

12. *Sejanus*, not herewith satisfied, strikes higher and harder at the discontented and improvident Lady: and having suborned some, who in shew of friendship should admonish her, that there was an intent to poyson her; and that therefore, she should shun to eate of the Banquet which *Tiberius*, her father in law had invited her to; She (unhappily credulous and rash of beliefe), when *Tiberius* offered her an Apple, withdrew her hand, and thereby very much offended him.

13. He also, (when there was appointed unto *Agrippina*

Agrippina and her sons a Scout-souldier to lye perdue, and to watch and observe their actions) instructed and suborned some to admonish her that she should fly to the Armyes of *Germany*; or else lay hold on the effigies and pourtraiture of *Augustus*, in the most frequented place of judicature; and also should invoke the aide and assistance of the Senate and people of Rome.

14. Moreover, by what kind of wickednesse he also circumvented his Client *Titius Sabinus*, that he might render him altogether suspected of Ambition to *Tiberius*; is to be read in the very History. Which being no lesse abominable, then worthy your remembrance; t'will not be irksome to thee Reader, that we have here run it over, in the very words of the worthy Historian, which are extant in the fourth Book of his Annals.

CHAP. XXIX.

The Argument.

Examples of Treasons and Disloyalties. Of false Letters, and false witnesses.

I Cannot but add one Example more out of the same *Cornelius Tacitus*. *Firmius Catus* a Senator, and of most intimate friendship with *Libo* a young Citizen of Rome, and one improvident and very soone to be drawne to vanities; drew the youth to the impious vowes of the Chaldean *Magicians*, and himselfe became an Interpreter and expounder of dreams to him; while he ostentates and boasts to him that *Pompey* was his great

Grandsire, that *Scribonia* (who was once the wife of *Augustus*) was his fathers Sister; that the *Cæsars* were his Cousin-germanes, and shewes him a house full of Pictures; encourageth him to Luxury and borrowing of money, being his Companion in his Lusts and necessities; that by many such shewes and representatures he might the better intangle him. He desires accesse to the Prince, having declared the Crime and Accusation; and the party accused by *Flaccus Vesculanius*, a Roman Knight, who had neerer familiarity and acquaintance with *Tiberius*. Annall fourth, Book the second.

2. *Stippiota*, whose wife in removing *Hagiotheodorita* before (Chap. 27 *Numb* 2.) we have related, could not shun but that, after the same manner with *Sabinus Romanus* (of which in the preceding Chapter. *Numb* 4.) he was almost circumvented. The builder of the snare was *Cameterus Logotheta*, who being an Enemy to *Stippiota* accuseth him before the Emperour as an Impostor; and one who had conceived in his intentions to betray *Sicilia*. And that the Calumny might resemble truth, he hides the Emperour in a corner in his Bed-Chamber; and in his hearing, begins to discourse with *Stippiota* (whom he had purposely invited thither,) of the affairs of *Sicily*; where some few things fell from him which were either contrary, or unpleasant to *Cæsar*. *Cameterus* not content with this, causeth feigned Letters to be put into *Stippiota*'s Boots, which by the Emperours Command being searched, *Stippiota* was condemned, and his Eyes put out.

3. This discourse brings us occasionally to the other

other way and means, by which we told you, that Calumnies and false accusations come to have the resemblance of truth: and this consists in the supposition, and pretence of forged and counterfeit Letters; And yet, this mode, and way could not so preserve and maintain it self, but that at length it vanished and came to nought, although it hath ever had the greatest force, to cause suspition to take the deeper impression in the mind of a Prince, and to alienate and estrange his will; which thing being considered, the parties accused fearing worse matters, have either spontaneously quitted their imployments; or else after the Calumny has been accepted and taken for granted, having attempted and set upon those very villaines, have added to and encreased such derraction: which is verified a little before by the Example of *Silvanus*, *Chap.* 28. *Num.* 10.

4. The perfidiousnesse and treachery of false witnesses, is a main and Principall ground, and prop for Calumnies and slanders, and such as they chiefly have need of, who accuse any one of high Treason, in betraying their Prince and Soveraign, whose domesticks are in this case most prevalent.

5. In the reign of *Arcadius*, *Eutropius* conspiring against *Timasius* an old Sword-man and of approved Authority, corrupted *Bargus* his Client, (or rather his most intimate familiar) with flattery and gifts, to accuse *Timasius* of affecting the Empire. *Bargus* puts his faith and credit out to use to the accuser *Eutropius* upon this account, because there having been such a conjunction between him and *Timasius*, he could not be

thought or believed to accuse of any such crime one so well deserving at his hands, unlesse he were most certaine of the truth thereof.

6. They adde moreover to the probation of the crime, feigned and forged Letters. By this meanes the most innocent man, together with his Son, is cast out into the Isle *Oasis* from whence neither of them returned.

7. *Cains Petronius* seemed better and more to be desired to *Nero*, then *Tygellinus*, for skill and knowledge in volupty and pleasures. *Scevinus*, the friend of *Petronius* was the Author of Conspiracy against *Nero*. Whereupon *Tigellinus* being destempered with Envy, having corrupted and misled a servant of his to detect *Petronius* of Emulation, by and by objecteth and layes to his charge his friendship with *Scevinus*, and his knowledge of, and being conscious to his enterprise. Annal. Book the 16th.

CHAP. XXX.

The Argument.

Of the Principall Grounds and Basis, of Detraction and Calumniation; the affection of the Prince to both parties: And of feigned friendship under occult and secret inveighings and backbitings.

WE have said before, that the affection of the Prince towards the Calumniator, makes very much to confirme and strengthen the Calumny. This was throughly noted in *Sejanus*,

nus, who endeavouring to bring *Agrippina* the widow of *Germanicus* under ſuſpition with *Livia Auguſta*, choſe *Julius Poſthumus* for his turne: for he, by the Adultery and forgery of *Mutilia Priſca*, was one of *Livias* intimate ones, and very fit for *Sejanus* his Counſels, but *Priſca* was very great in the opinion of *Auguſta*. They are the words of *Tacitus*, in his fourth book.

2. But the ſnares and guiles of Calumnies have a more compendious, and ſhort procedure and determination, if the party ſlandered have formerly been any whit ſuſpected by the Prince. For then the Calumniator, may not onely thereby ſuppreſſe the other, but advance himſelfe alſo.

3. The familiars and friends of *Aulus Vitellius*, would not ſet upon *Junius Bleſus*, before ſuch time as they perceived *Vitellius* his benevolence and friendſhip towards him, begin to waxe ſtale; and do the ſooner obtain their deſire, becauſe *Vitellius* his brother *Lucius* accommodates them with his aid in the accuſation. *Hiſt.* Book the third.

4. *Gracchus*, one of the Children of *Caſar*, and, as *Tacitus* ſaith in the 13th of his *Annals*, by experience and Age having been taught in the Princes family, even from the time of *Tiberius*, thought, that the beſt way, and remedy for him to conſerve and keep the favour of the Prince, was, to accuſe *Cornelius Sylla*, whom *Nero* had a good while before ſuſpected. The like Art *Tigellinus* uſeth againſt the ſame *Sylla* and *Plautus*. Whereof *Tacitus* in the 14th of his Annals ſaith thus. *Tigellinus* groweth dayly more ſtrong, ſuppoſeth

poseth his evill arts in which only he excelled, will become the more acceptable, if he can but linck the Prince in association of his lewd enterprises, his fear then would have a starting hole. And having found that *Plautius* and *Sylla* were much dreaded, *Plautius* having been lately removed into *Asia*, *Sylla* into *Gallia Narbonensis*, makes mention of, and commemorates their nobility, and neer Allies, the one of the *Easterne* the other of the *Germane* Army. After a few other passages he turnes quite about, and bespeaks *Sylla* a needy indigent fellow, and by that means notably adventurous and saucy, and a Counterfeiter of sloath and negligence, while he may find a place for temerity and rashnesse. *Plautius* by reason of his great wealth was unfeignedly desirous of ease and idlenesse.

5. We have spoken of *Ursicinus* his being accused by *Eusebius* the Eunuch, before the Emperour *Constantius*, to whom he was formerly under an ill opinion by reason of his alliance & neerness of kindred to *Gallus* before (in the 27 *Chap. Numb.* 11.) not observing the event of that cause which was this: The Eunuch fearing that he should want Arguments to prove the crime, devises another craft and treachery, desires the matter of accusation may be protracted, and the judgment for a time suspended. The businesse then remaining undecided, he obligeth to himself *Ursicinus*, whom he seems to free from the danger of the judgment, yet withall removes him from Court, which was his chief aime, making great shew of friendship therein, but occultly and privately inveighing against him to the Prince,

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXI.

The Argument.

The Art of Calumniators and the chiefe meanes of detracting; To accuse one of a speech which in it self is true but fould, and not spoken by the accused; and by a shew of relating the words of others, to reprove the evill actions of the Prince without punishment or danger.

THey who accuse another to have spoken evill of the Prince, by how much they draw and heap up more evill words from those which are true, by so much the easie wil their accusations find credit and belief.

2. This evidently appeares in the example of *Granius Marcellus* whom (as *Tacitus* saith in the 1 book of his *Annals*) *Cæpio Crispinus* accused to have uttered some sinister and unhappy words touching *Tiberius*, a crime inevitable, sith that the accuser chooseth something of the Prince's vicious actions, and objecteth them to the accused's charge to have spoken of. For because they were true, therefore were they believed to have been spoken by him.

3. Many Calumniators having followed this Example have upbraided and twitted the Emperours with their faults, by a shew of relating other mens speches, without reproof. This alone, in a manner moved them, to be very sparing in giving ear to false accusers.

4. And truly *Tiberius*, as he was a hater of reproaches,

proaches, ſo was he a lover of calumnies and accuſations; and leſt he ſhould hear the one, when he was preſent in the Senate, and that the other might not be omitted, departed to *Capreæ*, believing (as the Hiſtorian ſaith) it was fit for him to ſhun the aſſembly of his Councills, and their votes, which commonly, while he was preſent with them, were grave and weighty. *Annal. Book* 4.

5. This way of upbraiding Princes, with their vicious actions, did they uſe, who tranſlating by checks and taunts the Matricide of *Nero*, accuſe others of the ſame crime, before *Cæſar*, who was the author thereof, with a deſire rather of rebukeing and diſcommending the wickedneſſe, then of deſtroying the party accuſed.

6. Theſe are the moſt uſuall wayes and modes which calumniators uſe; for who can enumerate them all? Calumny is a Monſter, which hath a thouſand figures and ſhapes, a thouſand crafts and cunning deceits.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXII.

The Argument.

Of the wiles and subtleties of Court-commendations, masked Courtiers, and such as disguise themselves. The inward intention and disposition of such, as commend or dispraise us, is to be looked into. The third way and means, by which one Courtier oppresseth and grieveth another, viz. *Power and Force.*

FRom Calumnies, let us come to Commendations; there is use made likewise of these in Courts, (as we have said) to suppresse and pul down others; the most here do palliate and cloak their odium, envy, and emulation, that so they may the more easily deceive and frustrate.

2. Thus did *Fabius Valens* scandalize *Mantius Valens*, by secret criminations, without his knowledge or mistrust; and that he might be the lesse aware of his deceits, would openly commend him. *Tacitus Hist.* 1.

3. So did *Eusebius* the Eunuch, impugne and overcome *Ursicinus*, by the inticeing allurements of immense and huge bounty and largesse, and did often openly call him, a stout and valiant man; being very crafty and cunning, to intangle and insnare the simple man, in his poysonous and deathfull intrapments; and in that season too powerful, as *Ammianus Marcellinus* reports.

4. *Alfonsus* King of *Arragon*, when a certain person had before him commended another, (besides

(besides his accustomed wont and manner) turning about to his friend, *Iste exitium haud dubiè ei, quem laudat, meditatur*, That man doubtlesse means ruine to him, whom he thus commendeth. Nor was the King mistaken in this opinion; for about six months after, he that so highly had commended, impleads and sues the other at Law, and had overthrown him, had not the King interceded.

5. *Mucianus*, when he could not oppresse *Antonius* the first, openly loadeth him with much commendations in the Senate, and secret promises; shewing and boasting, that the nigher *Spain* was vacant, by the departure of *Cluvius Rufus*; and bestowes upon his friends Tribuneships and Offices: And after he had puft up his mind with hope and desire, remitteth and weakeneth his force and strength, by dismissing the seventh Legion in their winter-quarters, whose love to *Antonius* was most ardent, *Tacitus* in the 4th. Book of his Histories.

6. Neither do Courtiers onely, but even Princes, when they desire to diminish and pull down some, take this way and road. *Tiberius* (having *Libo* under secret suspect and envy) advanceth him to the Pretorship, and feasteth him often, not being estranged in countenance, not moved in language, and so conceals his anger, as *Tacitus* saith, in the second Book of his Annalls. By the same Art, he also overthrew *Sejanus*. *Domitian* was never more to be feared, then when in his countenance he made shew of courtesie. *Nicetas* was wont to call the commendations of *Andronicus*, the beginnings of an injury; his liberality,

a token of confiscation of goods; his lenity, the forerunner of death.

7. Some, in commending others, have this reach, that thereby they may kindle the Prince's hate against them. By this means, was *Julius Agricola* suppressed by *Domitian*; whereupon, *Tacitus* writing of *Agricola*, saith thus; The cause of his danger, was not any crime or complaint of hurting any body, but the Prince's being displeased at his vertues, and the glory of the man, and withall (that worst sort of friends) such as commend and applaud.

8. *Julian* the Emperour had a saying, *Nullos esse capitaliores hostes quam larvatos Aulicos*: There are none more capital and deadly enemies, then masked and vizarded Courtiers, such as *Polybius*, and, after him, *Mamertinus* describes; who, in a Panegyrick, and flattering speech, speaks thus: *Callido artificio accusatoriam dicacitatem laudum titulis peragebant in omnibus conventiculis, quasi per benevolentiam*: They rehearsed accusatory scoffings and reproaches, by a cunning Art, under the titles of commendations, in all their conventicles, and private meetings, as done out of good will.

9. But we may then discover those commendations to be usurped by some, when in commending one, they endeavour to bewray and denote another, as unlike to him. This kind of malignity, *Plutarch* objects to *Herodotus*, when he saies, that the Athenians were commended by him, as valiantly retunding and repressing the Persians Armies; not with a desire to extoll the Athenians, but to disgrace and defame the others.

10. It

10. It is usuall with Kings, as *Seneca* testifieth, to commend their ministers and servants, who are deceased, that so they may shame such as are living. Thus did *Augustus* advance and set forth, the faithfull duty and services of *Mecœnas* and *Agrippa*, when having openly manifested the sensualities of their daughters, he would reprehend his familiars and friends, as careless and negative of their Prince's business and fame.

11. *Augustus* beats *Tiberius* black and blew, by commending and excusing him; whereof *Tacitus* writing in the first Book of his Annals, saith thus, *Augustus* a few years before, had required of the State and Councill, that *Tiberius* should have the power of a Tribune, although in an honourable Oration, he had yet cast out something, touching his habit and attire, and his institutions and purposes; all which, as seeming to excuse, he upbraids and casts in his teeth.

12. These things therefore should admonish us, that we endeavour to look into the inward intents, and dispositions of such, as either praise or reproach us.

13. We told you, that the last way and means, by which Courtiers are oppressed by their enemies, is, Force and Strength, which then principally takes place, when either People or Souldiery, being offended at our dignity or manners, stir up sedition.

14. 'Tis not unknown, what tumults were amongst the Parisians, how they were heated therewith, when *John* King of *England* was taken prisoner. Nor is the condition and fortune of those unknown, who, when his son was Vice-Roy,

Roy, held the principall offices and dignities in the Kingdome.

15. Not many years since, the seditions of the Janizaries, swept away Ministers of chief authority, from the Turkish Emperours. The times of *Arcadius* the Emperour, will afford us some examples hereof, from the most ancient Histories. *Ruffinus* was very neer and deer (amongst the chiefest) to that Prince, who being offended with *Stilico*, and meditating his ruine and destruction, sends *Gaina* with the Armies, as an Auxiliary to the Emperour; but, in very deed, to take away the life of *Ruffinus*, which also was accomplished: For *Ruffinus* being gone forth with the Armie, the Souldiers of *Gaina* having risen up, by giving a signall, compassed him about, and tore him in pieces. *Eutropius* being substituted in place of *Ruffinus*, had likewise offended some prime Courtiers; and (the same *Gaina* being the plotter and contriver) *Tribigildus* moves sedition; who flying over, and dispoyling *Asia*, denies peace upon any other tearms or advantage, then, that *Eutropius* should be taken away: To which Law, at length (*Gaina* driving the Chariot) the Emperour consenteth. Nor was this enough; the same *Gaina* afterwards, openly joyning with *Tribigildus*, that it might be manifested, that he was reconciled to *Arcadius*, requires, that *Aurelianus Salurinus*, and *John Chrysostomus*, (then chief men in transacting affairs) should be delivered up to their arbitrement and pleasure; whom (being delivered up) he commands to banishment; and was content, that he had given

them occasion, to bewail the edge of their own swords.

CHAP. XXXIII.

The Argument.

Sometimes the fierce and untractable genius and dispostion of the Prince, envying such as are deserving, is amongst the causes, why the Courtier is disfavoured and dis-esteemed by him. How such displeasure is to be handled and ordered.

VEry often, Courtiers, who think themselves guarded on all hands, happen upon a Prince, whose Genius is vain, distruttfull, envious, covetous, cruell, or timidous; which proves to their inevitable ruine. These diseases, as planted in Nature, do mostly what delude the circumspection of the most prudent. *Seneca*, owing much to his liberty with *Nero*, but little to his service, although prudent, and not uncrafty in Courtly Arts; yet being overcome, as it were, by the malice of the Prince's genius and disposition, yielded at last. He first incurs his envy by his eloquence and wealth; and afterwards falling under calumny and false accusations, was bereft of the Prince's favour, and his own life together.

2. The diffidence and envy of Princes, towards some, hath been so formidable, that they had rather suffer a diminution and abatement of their own emoluments, and profits, then be highly active, with their Prince's envy and displeasure. 3. *Pub-*

3. *Publius Ventidius*, fearing the Envy of *Marc Antony*, (by whose Authority he waged warr;) was content to have repelled the *Parthians* in three severall battells even to *Media*, yet would not prosecute the victory.

4. The same thing did *Belisarius*, when *Justinian* was Emperour, as *Agathias* sayes; when in like manner he feared, least the greatnesse of the victory, and applause of the people, should stirre up the hatred of the Nobles and afterwards of the Prince.

5. Such as these, neither provide rightly for the utility and advantage of the Prince; nor their owne honours. But the fault nevertheless is not in them so much, as in him that rules; and for this cause *Mercœnas* perswades *Augustus*, that he should neither impute sinister Events to his Ministers, not successefull to Himselfe. For (saies he) many of those who handle publique affaires, fearing to be envyed by the Prince, have more negligently acted in their Imployment; chusing rather to run the hazard of Glory, then safety.

6. Their course notwithstanding, seems best in my approbation; who, to avoid Envy, whatsoever notable Enterprize they publish and set forth, attribute the glory thereof to the Prince, though absent at the time of the action.

7. *Agrippa* the son in law of *Augustus*, perswadeth those who take in hand great matters, to attribute the thing accomplished to the Prince; and himselfe did often so. Thus *Joab* when he had besiged *Rabbath* and could have subdued it, would not before *David* himselfe was come; *Crassus* when the warr was to be composed, with

Ariacena; waited for the presence of *Alexander*. *Julius Agricola*, as *Tacitus* reports, never triumphed for any Actions to his owne fame and renowne, but referred the fortune to the Author, and Generall, looking on himselfe, but as a Minister and instrument.

8. This same Envy and Emulation, (for the others though divers are heere the like in effect;) let it be that they are diseases, yet have they been common and familiar to the most generous Princes; such as were *Philip*, and *Alexander*; and do more strongly blast some, then others.

9. *Theodosius* the second of that name, had delegated and appointed the care of those Seas, which flowed up to Constantinople, to *Syrus* to be immured and walled in; which worke when he had effected in sixty dayes, this Celerity and speedy dispatch was so gratefull to the people; that they cryed out on all sides, that the City was built by *Constantine*, but renewed by *Cyrus*. This being heard of the Emperour, stirr'd up such Envy in him, that *Cyrus* to expiate it, was necessitated to put on the hood.

10. He that hath to do with such dispositions, may think that he walkes upon the hot imbers; and therefore ought with all diligence so to act, as that he may diligently search out their inclinations; that so he may guard himselfe against them, or if that may not be done; he may at least be conscious to himselfe, of having not omitted his duty and office.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXIIII.

The Argument.

Of obtaining favour with, and retaining an office under the Prince's successour. The kinds of Calumniatours that hinder us in this place. The dexterity and quicknesse of stopping and restraining them. A true friend in Court, is Rara avis *seldome found.*

1. HE may worthily be reckoned amongst the happy ones, and as it were the Chickens of fortune; whose Authority with the Prince from whom he had his beginning, remaines in the same height and loftinesse with his Successor. This is rare in Courts, because he who presumeth to be next; by retaining his office, is for the most part suspected to those that rule; and being so eminent in this place, they are very often necessitated to crosse and thwart such persons which yeelds most frequent seed to deadly feuds and hatred.

2. And besides this, the successor of a Prince hath mostly his owne Ministers and Servants, well known to him by their long and faithfull service and imployments, to whom that they may make way to dignities and honours, he will pull down the Clients and retainers of the deceased, either freely or by perswasion to give place to others, that are petitioners.

3. There are yet some, whom either the matter of their imployments for which they are apter then others, their office whatever it be insinuateth them onto the succeeding Prince's acceptance, that be-

ſides the deceaſed Prince he would not part with any ſuch a one.

4. *Macro* to ingratiate himſelfe with *Caligula* ſubornes and incenſeth his wife, *Ennia*, to entiſe the young man by love, and to contract matrimony with him, that ſo ſhe might overcome him and prevaile with him. The ſame *Macro* cauſeth *Tiberius* when he lay dying, to be oppreſſed and overcharged, with the weight of heavy Clothes caſt upon him, as ſayeth *Tacitus* in his ſixth Book. *Julian* the Emperour retaines *Arbetio* by him, although he hated him for his pride, and for his contentious and turbulent ſpirit, conceiving him to be neceſſary to him. Afterwards *Valentinian* calls the ſame *Arbetio* to Court of purpoſe, that he might oppoſe and ſet himſelfe againſt *Procopius*.

5. We have ſhewne hitherto, what a Courtier is to ſhun and avoid, who would enjoy the grace and favour of his Prince. The head and chief of all Counſells, which can in this place be given a Courtier, is, Modeſty towards the Prince; meaſuring himſelfe not in himſelfe, nor comparing himſelfe with himſelfe; not framing himſelf I ſay, by the Modul of fortune, but of his own duty, acting nothing boaſtingly and in a bravadoe, nothing irreverently, avoyding Envy (as much as is poſſible). A thing ſo formidable to many worthies and ancient Grandees; that many (prerending unfitneſſe, or other inability to mannage them); others (betaking themſelves to their books,) have with drawne and eſtranged themſelves from the publique Negotiations, as one, whereof Hiſtorians make mention, of *Domitian*; as the other, of *Galba*.

6. Firſt

6. First we will carefully transmit, and passe over those Commendations of Malevolent persons, and the Calumnies; of which we have already spoken.

7. They who slander us, or say, that there is wanting in us some of those things which are requisite to the well serving of a Prince; and affirme that we have spoken something amisse, and with intention to offend; or else have by Act, hurt and injured some body.

8. The fault which is objected against us, is either to be excused, or amended; or else expiated and purged by the operation of other vertues. As also all our words and deeds are so to be moderated, that they become not obnoxious to Sinister interpretations and constructions. Therefore the mind of another, is first to be scrued and searched into; before we disclose our owne. But if through carelesnesse, somewhat may fall from us, that may be offensive, we must shew, and evidence to them; (either by some good office to be performed for them, or by casting in some smooth and handsome interpretation, by other words and speeches), that we had no mind to offend them in our discourse.

9. If we have cognizance that we are calumniated, it will be advisedly and wisely done of us; to be as little absent, and at distance from the party, to whom we are accused, as possible may be. For besides this, that affection towards such as are absent freezeth in time; the reproach and slander, unlesse maturely and timously repelled, and foiled by the aide of verity and truth, will more easily find place; which (the course being

turned, and a doubt speedily injected), will flagg and wither: but by delay, and none contradicting the accuser's affirmations, will be corroborated and strengthned, and take roote in the Prince's mind, and carry him so farre; as that he may hate the party accused, before he inquire into the Crime.

10. He therefore that will be rightly advised herein, shall procure himselfe one, or more friends; who in his absence may defend him from the assaults of Slander: but be sure they be persons of honour; and such, as to whose defence the Prince may no lesse give eare, then to the others Calumnies. But of such friends, I confesse there is great sterility and barrenne se at Court: where it is mostly usuall amongst all, either to oppresse their fellowes; or suffer them to be oppressed. Yet it happens sometimes that there may be one, who by benefits received from us; or by desire to oblige us to them; or lastly out of hate to the Accuser; may be moved and perswaded to such a good turne.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXV.

The Argument.

How much Oſtentation is to be avoided by a Courtier in favour with the Prince. What Retinew he may have. Of Courtly modeſty & moderation. The reaſon and proportion of Clients and Retainers, and of friends.

A Courtier ſhould not only ſhun Oſtentation and boaſting of his Prince's favour, that ſo he may avoid the Envy of Compeers and equalls (of which we have ſpoken *Chap.* 19.) but that of the Prince alſo.

2. When on a time the *Spaniſh* Nobility in the Raign of *Philip* the ſecond, went about to root out and overthrow Cardinall *Spinoſa*, ſee how they go about to undermine him: they all lay down their Maſes and Offices at his foot, they all feigne and profeſs that he is the Hinge upon which their fortunes depend. The Prince's domeſtick Miniſters and ſervants offer themſelves ready at his beck. When the King gets intelligence hereof he is removed from Court; and within two years decayes, what ever the loftie ſtructure of power were, that he had built to himſelf.

3. Let a Courtier therefore learn to be contented with a ſmall retinue and train, to keep his ſtation, and ſubſiſt with that dignity wherewith the Prince hath adorned him, and rather below his degree; but let him never tranſgreſſe his bounds. Its unſeaſonable to diminiſh and curtaile ones

train

train onely in a declining Fortune. 'Twas no boot to *Seneca* after he had left *Nero's* favour to betake himself to a private Cottage, and to have composed and built up to himself a Pyramid of studies, and under pretence of unhealthinesse to deny entrance to visitors; nor did it any thing ease the mind of *Agricola*, by night, and with slender attendance, to walke about the City.

4. It behoveth very much that a man do timously compose and module himself to temperance and moderation.

5. Yet although we would not have you be surround with the noise and rout of many suitors & attenders; nevertheless would we not have you neglect to make many your Clients and retainers: not such as should serve for your pomp and solemnity; but such, as, if any dysaster should befall thee, may either restore and renew, or at least refresh and comfort thee.

6. For though sinister and unhappy Fortune hath found but few such friends, yet hath it most found some, who if they cannot eye friendship yet may they for their own benefit and commodity, have respect to somthing tending to the conserving and preservation of thy Fortune.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVI.

The Argument.

Comforts in adverse fortune. The benefits of Princes are to be dispensed warily: His favour is not to be too much divided amongst others. By what means one may intercede for others. Favour is not ambitiously to be boasted of. The free arbitrement of Princes in acting. What commands of his are to be obeyed & dispatched. The reason of a Princes dresse and sumptuousnesse. How we are to deale with one that complains to us of being offended and hurt by the Prince. Of the Court houshold service. What is the most especiall part and Office of Courtly wisdome.

But yet, as it is a great Comfort and consolation in adverse fortune, to have communicated with others in our prosperity, and to have used the favour of the Prince to lift up and advance others: so is a Courtier also to be admonished that he dispense and bestow those benefits warily. For it is most certain, that whatever the Prince hath conferred on another at our request is in a great measure to be imputed to us. Therefore his grace and favour, unlesse it be very great towards us, is not to be too much divided amongst others; and very seldome are others who are not after some sort knowne to the prince, to be recomended unto him. That of *Horace* is to be observed.

Qualem

Qualem commendes, etiam atque etiam adspice: ne mox
Incutiant aliena tibi peccata pudorem.

Englished thus,

Such as in friendly wise thou wouldst commend,
Be sure thou try them as thou wouldst thy friend.
Lest by their faults thy self should get disgrace;
By their reproof a blush light on thy face.

2. If we desire to beg a Boon of the Prince let our request be just, and accommodated and fitted to time; conjoyned likewise with the dignity and Emolument and advantage of the Prince, and such as the like hath been obtained by many others. If the Prince signifieth his consent, let us manifestly evidence that we accept it as a very great benefit and bounty; if he refuse, we must be very carefull, that we give him not cause to think that we are discontented.

3. Here also must we observe that which before *Chap.* 35. *Num.* 1. we admonished, that we do not ambitiously ostentate and boast of the Princes favour, as if we had him obnoxious to our Commands, which some having done have ill succeeded as we shewed. What ever Princes act, they desire to seem to act it, by their own free Arbitrement and will, without the additament and props, or Authority of others, especially of their subjects.

4. If the Prince give us in Command any thing hard and perilous, lets endeavour to have it comprehended

prehended in writing, and if possible to be most accurately and exquisitely gathered and composed; if any difficulties occur in executing them, let us ripen them, and before we betake us to the Province and place appointed to execute them in, let us not omit or neglect to unfold and declare them, if the matters be not fit to be written and be to be committed to us in secret, we are often to iterate and repeat them over in his presence, that we may more throughly understand the mind of the Commander, and he may see, that his Authority in the things which we act, is not denyed.

5. That which remains, is, We ought to shew our promptitude and readinesse to do, even the meanest offices the Prince Commands us to. A small matter ofttimes opens a way to a great fortune; and Princes will have their Commands to be estimated, not by the weight and ponderosity of the things commanded, but by the magnitude and greatnesse of their own fortune: and therefore are not lesse offended at our abandoning and disdaining of their lesse and easie Commands, than of the hardships and hazards they expose us to, by their imployment.

6. When we are neer the Prince, we ought assiduously to watch that we be not overrun with suddain and unexpected commands, or taken tardy in doing something besides our businesse and imployment. To this purpose, let us (as much as may be) observe and preoccupate in our mind, the things which are incumbent on us, and prepare our thoughts to every thing which falls into agitation, and that we speak not many things

to the Prince, nor any thing that we do not well know and understand. When the Prince speaks, let us be intent, and not minding other matters, neither let us appear sad, and full of thoughts, lest we seem, either not to hear, or by a careless hearing, to transmit and passe over slightly his speeches.

7. If any one that is grieved by the Prince shall come to us and complain of his fortune; let us shew, that we pitty his case, and perswade him to silence and patience: let us also raise him up to hope well, extenuating the Injury done to him, and excusing the Prince. But we must act very circumspectly with such; for there are some who feigne themselves injured, that so they may pump and draw up something from us, which may signifie a sinister and evill will in us, towards the Prince, and may thereby find occasion to oppress us. Others are (*re vera*) and in truth grieved and hurt, yet oftentimes being imprudent and silly, and carried away by affection and selfishnesse, do not conceale those things which are communicated to them in secret trust.

8. If it be our fortune to have the charge of a family, we ought to keep our servants also from speaking more freely against the Prince, or such as are by affection and love chiefly endeered to him; for the fault of a houshold servant is oftimes tranferred upon the Master.

9. This is amongst the choisest parts and Offices of Courtly wisdom, *viz.* to be able sagaciously and prudently to resent the Princes affection, when either changed, or but luke-warm towards us. If any such thing should happen, it is gently

ly and sweetly to be dissolved and untyed as the knot of love; but in no wise to be broken and torne open, till that the Cause of this change of affection be abolished; for so a returne to the former favour is sometimes given, especially if we seeme not to have remembred the injury; or else cleerly to have never so much as heeded or regarded it.

CHAP. XXXVII.

The Argument.

A judgment touching the Constancy and mutations and changes of Princely love and Benevolence. Felicity inexplicable and intricate; The Court starr.

THat a Courtier may rightly judge of the constancy and permanency of the Prince's good will, towards him, it is not enough that he be knowing of the Princes Genius and disposition, and the Authority and power both of his friends and foes; he ought first throughly to weigh and consider the cause, which enkindled this love of the Prince towards him. For if that which was the cause should cease in us, or be found more valid and strong in another; doubtlesse the Princes affection towards us, will altogether cool; or at least be lessened.

2. It's sometimes difficult to divine, what the cause is for which thou art beloved; and as *Ausonius* sayes, This is a felicity, the reason whereof we cannot render. But ordinarily, this love of Princes ariseth, either from a similitude and likeness of

of disposition; or from the grace and comelinesse of our deportment and behaviour, or from some duty and offices performed; or some other vertue and aptitude to obey their will.

3. That love, which that externall and outward grace and likenesse of manners produceth; although it seeme most firme and stable, doth soonest of all wax old and decay; both because as we have said, the Genius and inclinations of men is changed according to age, and the variety and change of intervening and accidentall affaires; and also for that it is a rare thing for two such like dispositions to be found, which may not in some thing differ and disagree. Oftimes also, that contrary thing which they have, is more prevalent to discord and division, then the things wherein they resemble each other, are to Concord and agreement.

4. Notwithstanding, I know not what starre or constellation, by an unusuall manner and way, doth so attemperate and season some men to the Prince; that he can not easily in any thing depart from, nor leave such a ones-fashions and temperature. And these are they, (I deny not) who reape a plentifull crop of good things before all others; especially if they know how, wittily and trimly to serve the time; and before a Tempest to furl up their sailes.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXVIII.

The Argument.

The love of Princes towards women. The paramours of Princes. Presents bestowed on Princes, are easily envyed. The condition of well deserving men in Court. The affections of some Princes towards such men. The reason why Rewards and Largesses are given and appointed for the undertaking of busines. the love of Princes towards such as minister to their volupties and delights.

WIth this kind of love, Princes are sometimes affected to Women; and that by so much the more, as they are prone to venerious volupties and pleasures.

2. From the same nevertheless do these fall away and decline; if not by their owne fault, yet at least by the satiety of the party loving, or by the sight of a better Love or Mistresse: whereby it cometh to passe, that they become more crafty and guilefull; who endeavour to divert the Prince from all familiarity and converse with others, especially with such, who seem fit and able to bend the Prince's mind another way. Some by feigned and counterfit disdaine, have kept them loving and kind to them. Others being more audacious, have ungirt and unbuckled those whom they perceive to be more obliged and constrained to them by Luxury and carnall pleasures and delights.

3. This art used *Poppæa* to *Nero*; of which yee

may see, in the words of the prince of Historians, in the 14. th of his Annals.

4. The female friends of Princes have oftimes more easily obliged some to them, after this mode and way then by flatteries or pleasures. But, there is no constancy (as we have said) in this kind of Love.

5. It were more convenient and agreeable indeed, that the love which thou hast, (as it were) hatched to thee and bred by services; should be more stable and firme, as that which is sprung from a more honest Cause; and fitter to allure and intice others, to the like offices and duties.

6. Yet very often, doth experience teach us the contrary; many times the chief benefits in Court are envyed, and those whose turne and office they cannot requite; they oft revenge with hatred.

7. Such are not willing to be indebted to any man, much lesse to a subject. They shun, and indure not, that deserving men should see them; as those who should upbraid their ingratitude, which is the cause that their condition, in Court, is most miserable; for, when by some office and service they have merited from the Prince, they are forthwith constrained by shamefacednesse, not to require their reward; and seeme by feare, not to have given, but sold their advantage and benefit. Princes, in the interim being careless of benefits and good turnes, and very sloathfull as to compensations and recompences, procrastinate and put off from day to day; untill the remembrance of the benefits wither and fade away from the minds of those, who are conscious and privy

to

to them, who before feared some secret taunts and reproaches.

8. Some understanding thus much, have thought it good to strike (as they say) while the Iron's hot; (that is to say) when they have known themselves destinated and appoynted to some certain businesse; before they would undertake it, have had an eye to the reward, knowing that the hope of receiving an Office, is more strong and vali'd with Princes, then the Hopes of a reward; that it is better to be obliged to Rulers, then to oblige them; because whom they oblige, they think should be benevolous and bear them good-will; he who hath obliged them, (because he may be thought not to love the Prince, who shall deny him his recompence and reward) shall be punished with odium and hatred, insteed of compensation. This was the judgement and opinion of *Lewis* the 11th, as *Comineus* reports.

9. Love towards those who Minister aid and assistance to the Prince's volupty, and are obedient thereto, seems fit to be more stable, and is so indeed so long as the Prince is constant to his own inclinations: But (they being changed) such as administer to them, are also changed; sometimes also the Prince, becomming conscientious of what is honest, abominates and casts away the Ministers together with the vice.

10. Moreover as the inclinations of the Prince are some more durable and lasting then others; so also the favour which we have spoken of to such as administer to them, will be alterable and unconstant.

CHAP. XXXIX.

The Argument.

Of the pleasures of Princes. Veneriall Love. Companions in evill actions. The affections of avarice and covetousnesse. Pretext of publique exactions and taxes. The morosity and peevishnesse of exacters denoted. The envy of Riches. What kind of avarice in a Prince may be consummated and accomplished. The too much facility and gentlenesse, and the insolency of Ministers, denoted and observed. A just occasion of enriching a mans selfe, is not to be refused.

I Shall not here meddle with all the voluptes to which a Prince's natures are prone, because they are not all such, as upon which the heighth of Court-fortune can be superstructed and built. There is a three fold kind of them, too common and familiar with Princes which I will rehearse *v.z.* Veneriall Love, Cruelty, and Covetuousnesse.

2. Veneriall Love, as it is mostly vehementer then the rest, so is it the more unconstanter; which although it may last in him, yet will he not long love and like one and the same party; and though he may not change the subject, yet (to use the Scholastick terme) he will change and vary the object. Nevertheless, very many have used this as the basis and foundation wherein they have reared and built up their fortunes, not sticking to prostitute and debauch their own wives that

that they might attain the Prince's favour. As we read in *Tacitus*'s 13th book of Annal. that one *Ortho* did, yet this succeeded not so, as to ingratiate him: for *Nero* removed him from Court, lest he should have a Rival neer him.

3. Others, that they might oblige the Prince, have associated themselves with him, and been contented to be witnesses and ministers of his misdeeds and lust. An example whereof was *Tigellinus*. Annal. 14th. These consider not, that Princes scrupple not to sacrifice such men at length to publique envy, to free themselves there from. Such servants of Lust may expect the same which *Remirus d'Orco* (that Minister of Cruelties to *Cæsar Borgia*) experienced, whom *Borgia* at length commanded to be put to death, as the perfor guilty of all those things, which himself had cruelly acted and done.

4. And by this example of *Remirus* we may learn their fate and destiny, who lend their aid to the cruelty of a Prince. Seldome is the Princes affection towards such, long-lived; both because he afterwards reads his own vices in them, and also, because he is afraid himself of them, whom he perceives and find so apt for villany.

5. *Nero* although of a cruell disposition, and an old and crafty Politician, after his mother was slaine hated *Anicetus*, whom he perceived to have upbraided him with his Matricide.

6. But least of all, is that affection of covetuousnesse mutable. The diversity of object changes not that, as it doth Love; it is not lessened and impaired with age, but increased; and although it be equally and alike hatefull to the people as

Cruelty is, yet is longer indured; because exactions have commonly a pretext of publique necessity, and honest parsimony, and likewise a species and shew of common utility. Hence therefore they who are Ministers herein, may seem longer to be sheltred by the Prince's amity, whiles that they (which is rare in such kind of men) be neither froward, nor testy and difficult, nor too greedy of wealth and gain.

7. Morosity, which for the most part is also contumelious and reproachfull, procures odium and envy both to the party, and to the Governour and Ruler of a people. The Author whereof the Prince at length will reject and cast off, that so he may remove the envy from himself. Riches are obnoxious to envy, not only of the multitude, but sometimes of the Prince himselfe; who, if truly covetous, will seldome be contented to have wrung out and squeezed the full sponge, which (as we read) *Vespatian* was wont to do, but will imitate the Peasants and Rustick people, who at last devoure and eat up those swine, which they have formerly cramm'd and fatted.

8. Certes, the Kingdome of France hath seen many such, who being rough and sharp beyond measure, or too hasty to enrich themselves, when they have acted too insolently, after a great and lofty fortune, have been brought to perdition and ruine.

9. In the Reign of *Philip* the faire, one *Peter Berchy* being Chauncellor of the Exchequer, and of the Prince's bed Chamber, was strangled at *Paris*. *Lewis* the son of *Philip* having afterwards attain'd to the Kingdom, *Enguerrandus Ma-*

rigny

Marigny fell into the like misfortune, under *Charls* the seventh. Guise in dignity equall to *Berchy*, being questioned by the law, was afterwards sown up in a Sack, and drowned. His successor *Camus Beauly*, was slain at *Poitiers*. The like Fate had befaln *Peter Essart*, in the time of *Philip* the first, had he not redeemed himself with a hundred thousand *Florens*.

10. I could name others, but I spare their memory, meane while the examples produced do sufficiently instruct, that the facility of such kind of Ministers brings too much detriment and hurt to the Princes utility; but their own insolency, attracteth hatred and destruction even to themselves. Too much Riches are to be avoided, which may stirre up against us; as also it is lawfull, not to refuse a just occasion of being wealthy.

CHAP. XL.

The Argument.

Aptitude and fitnesse for businesse in a Courtier, is the ultimate cause of Princely grace and favour. What consideration is to be had therein, to wisdome and glory. The weakenesse of Courtly power. Soveraigne Counsell, for such as act highly. A Compendium of a sedate and quiet life, and of the Author's wish.

THe last of the causes, for which Courtiers are beloved of the Prince, now remaines; which in the 37. th Chap. *Numb.* 2. we told you, was aptnesse and expeditiousnesse in doing the Prince's businesse; which when we have observed to be acceptable to the Prince, we must also mark, whether or no it be therefore pleasant and taken in good part, because necessary; or because the Prince's desire provoked him, to such an aptitude. If acceptable because necessary, the love will endure so long as the necessity lasteth; nevertheless it will be rather a forced, then a voluntary and free love.

2. If the Prince aspire the glory of this kind of aptitude, we may not doubt, but that they who in this shall exceed him; will in time be grievous to him. Sith that, there is an imbred desire, not in Princes onely, but in all men, to excell all others in the art they professe; Certes, no man scarcely can with an equall and moderate mind beare it, if he be surpassed by his houshold servant.

3. *Asinius*

3. *Asinius Pollio* being exhorted by some to answer and requite something that *Augustus* had written against him, with some verses; answered *Nolle se ejus, qui posset proscribere, scribendo incurrere invidiam*: That he would not incurre the Envy of him by writing, in whose power it lay to proscribe and banish him.

4. There being a controversie sometimes betwixt *Favorinus* a Philosopher, and *Adrian* the Emperour, concerning some word, when the Emperour had posed him, and his friends admired it, he answered thus: *Non erubesco, vinci scientia ab illo, qui triginta Legionibus imperat*: I am not ashamed to be conquered in knowledge by him, who hath thirty Legions at his command.

5. It is a known precept of wisdome *Coram Rege noli videri Sapiens*: Seem not to be wise in the presence of the King. It cannot otherwise be, for to purchase the Prince's favour here, we ought to desert and lose our own glory: and not only when we have to do with words, but in every thing we ought to submit and yield him the Palme of victory. And to that end, it will not be impertinent and besides the purpose, that a man sometimes admit against himselfe somewhat (though a little hurtfull) even by his own consent and procurement.

6. From the things hitherto discoursed on, it appeares, of what slender stability and durableness all kind of Court-powers are. These therefore are the most soveraign advicements and counsels which can be given to such as act highly and eminently, *ad descensum in arenam preparare sese*:

to

to make them ready for Combat, though it be judged more generous and couragious, to fight him who enters the List, than to flye. Notwithstanding if we must fight with more perill then Guerdon and recompence, a man may not be ashamed maturely to retreat, and to imitate the *Parthians*, who fight as they flye.

7. It is also more glorious and commendable to descend slowly, and by gradatious and steps, then precipitately and rashly to commit himself into others hands, and retreat through a certain and sure posterne, then to be thrown out at the window. So having found a pretence, it is lesse dishonourable, freely and spontaneously to bid adieu to honour, then to tarry till you be repelled, and removed. To this may be added the saying of an antient Roman, *Quid fatigata felicitate molestus es? Quid expectas donec Castris ejiciaris?* why art thou troubulous to tired felicity? why tarriest thou, till thou be removed out of the Camp?

8. 'Tis happinesse (saith *Seneca*) to dye in felicity. On the contrary, I deem him a happy Courtier, who in the middle of felicity betakes himself to a retirement. Peradventure he that doth so, shall not find the like judgment from all men in this particular, and shall seem unworthy of his fortune, the messenger whereof he so suddenly turns back: but who so is prudent will not stick at these sayings, but will rather provide for his safety; and will call to mind, that at all Games and pastimes which depend on fortune, 'tis better to break off a Gainer, then a Looser; and that it is not a wise mans part to change certainties for hazards and doubtfull chances.

9 And

9. And mostly men ascend gradually to such a heighth of dignities; but who will not admire to see one descend from on high, when he sees no Staires or Ladders under him? And if so be that by the fulgor, and brightnesse of too great a fortune, a man be inveigled and dazelled, and one pace or step faile him (as may easily happen to such as live in a lofty and high condition) they may not be said then to descend, but to fall headlong.

10. You have now (friendly Reader) the summe of such things which I conceive may as to these subjects herein treated of, satifie your desire, which I have principally aimed at in collecting them them. Whether they may be profitable and behoovefull to thee, *tu videris*, see to that thy selfe: they have indeed long since been of no use to me; take therefore as a Compendium and Epiphonema of my Life and wishes, these Verses of *Seneca*.

Stet quicunque volet potens
Aulæ culmine lubrico;
Me dulcis saturet quies,
Obscuro positus loco.
Leni perfruar otio;
Nullis nota Quiritibus,
Ætas per tacitum fluat.
Sic, quam transierint mei
Nullo cum strepitu dies;
Plebeius moriar senex.
Illi mors gravis incubat.
Qui, notus nimis omnibus,
Ignotus moritur sibi.

Englished

Englished thus.

Let who will stand advanc'd
On Courtships slippy Calme;
Me sweet repose shall please
Confind to place obscure;
I shall enjoy my ease.
Unkenn'd of Courtly sparke
My time in silence glides
Thus when my dayes shall flit
Without either noise or train
I shall decease an old Plebeian,
He dyes a painfull death
Who's too well known of all
Yet's to himself unknown.

FINIS.

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